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482 482 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. of respect," and the Supreme Courts of Indiana, North Carolina, and Ala- bama have distinctly repudiated it, the latter overruling a number of cases where its existence had been recognized. See 5 Thompson on Corpora- tions, 5115 ; Bafik of Crawfordsville v. Dovetail ^c. Co., 40 N. E. Rep. 810 (Ind.) ; Thomson- Houston Co. v. Henderson Co.j 21 S. E. Rep. 951 (N. C.) ; Jewelry Co. v. Volfer^ 17 So. Rep. 525 (Ala.), Just what the doctrine is, even those who uphold it do not seem to know. It seems to be an accommodating judicial ignis fatuus, which is present or absent as courts seem to require. No court has been able to describe it exactly or to define its limits. It is admitted that there is no trust in the strict sense of the term. But these admissions tend to still greater confusion. The logical conclusion of holding that there was a strict trust would be that the creditor of an insolvent corporation could not enforce his claim at law. When this argument was pressed on the court in Gott- lieb V. Miller (154 111. 44), they qualified their previous statement by holding that there was a *' quasi trust " only. The United States Supreme Court has long been committed to the " trust fund " doctrine, yet in the recent case of Hollins v. Brierjield ^'c. Co. (150 U. S. 371) Justice Brewer practically admits that the expression is figurative ; and Justice Bradley, in Graham v. R. R. Co. (102 U. S. 148), while upholding the doctrine, is forced to acknowedge that " if pushed to its logical conclusion, it would lead to results not to be tolerated," and yet he does not seem able to define the Hmits within which it will be tolerated. This general haziness that surrounds the whole doctrine leaves the student in a confused state of uncertainty as to what the doctrine really is. Mr. Pepper, however, in a recent able article (2 Am. Law. Reg. & Rev., N. s. 448), clears up much of this uncertainty. ■ He deprecates the use of the expression " trust fund " as a misleading misnomer, and suggests that the courts have used it as a cover for judicial legislation. The cases seem to justify this view, and it must be admitted that justice often demands legislation by the courts in dealing with insolvent corporations. RECENT CASES. • Admiralty — Recovery for Death by Wrongful Act. — Wliere a State statute gives the personal representative of one killed by the negligent handling of a vessel a right of action, and makes any damages that may be recovered a lien upon such vessel, /z«f/^/, a suit may be maintained in the Federal courts to enforce such right of action. The Willamette, 70 Fed. Rep. 874. It has been frequently argued that there can be no recovery in suits of this kind, on the ground that there is no action given by general maritime law, and it is not compe- tent for a State to alter this. But statutes giving a recovery exist in some thirty States, and their validity has been upheld in Sherlock. A llini^,^]^ U. S. 99. An elaborate review of the authorities is found in The City of A'orwalk, 55 Fed. Rep. 98. Bills and Notes — Fictitious Payee. — A clerk of the plaintiffs represented to them that they were indebted to B., and they drew a check to the order of B. in pay- ment. There was no such person as B., and the clerk indorsed the check to the defendant, a /^flz/^yfrt'^ purchaser, who received payment from the bank. In an action for the money, it was held, that the check was payable to bearer, and there could be no recovery against the defendant, a holder in due course. Glutton v. Atteitboroui^h, [1.895] 2Q. B. 707. This affirms the judgment of Wills, J., [1805] 2 Q. B. 306. The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, provides that where the payee is fictitious the bill may be treated as payable