Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/479

451 WHAT ARE DECREES IN PERSONAM? 45 1 jurisdiction, and a citation to be served out of jurisdiction is allowed. Judge Aldrich calls this practice an improvement upon ours, and thinks '* it would be no great enlargement of the rule of relief laid down in Felch v. Hooper against a foreigner, for the court to decree, in accordance with the English rule, specific perform- ance of a contract concerning land within jurisdiction, although the defendant should be out of jurisdiction and never had been within it." ^ Some questioner may ask, " Does all this transfer the Brunswick title to the Englishman? Can a man be made a landowner with- out his acceptance?" We have alluded to this, and should even incline to agree with the questioner, but shall not do so quite yet, because of the opinion of Shaw, C, J., in Concord Bank v. Bellis^: " A good conveyance may be made by deed poll to an infant, lunatic, or feme covert (1852), although such grantee would be under legal disability to convey. It is true that in theory of law the grantee in a deed poll is held to be a party by accepting the deed, but the deed does not derive its efficacy as a grant and conveyance from the act of the grantee in accepting, but from that of the grantor in executing it. In case of a plain, absolute conveyance without conditions, either no special acceptance is necessary to give it effect, or what is nearly the same thing, the acceptance of the grantee will be presumed. So the delivery of the deed to a third person (the clerk), unconditionally, for the use of the grantee, gives effect to the deed." But was it ever supposed that the actual acceptance by a re- calcitrant vendee of a tendered deed was an essential preHminary to the enforcement of vendor's rights? If so, farewell to all redress against foreigners; — yes, and frequently against citizen vendees too, for they can leave as the decree approaches, or if in jail for con- tempt still refuse to accept if sufficiently angry. The court cannot compel acceptance by the foreigner, — it can only permit. Even where personal citation is made (on the foreigner in transit) and when the personal jurisdiction is clear,^ all attempt to compel acceptance would be futile. Did any one ever hear of a court trying to compel actual acceptance by foreigner or citizen of either deed or money? Does any one care whether he accepts or not? Certainly phrases occur about "compelling acceptance,"* and we 1 Aldrich, Eq. PI. & Pr. 44-46. » Thompson v. Cowell. 2 10 Cush. 278.
 * Richmond v. Gray, 3 Allen, 27-31 ; Park v. Johnson, 7 Allen, 383.