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360 36o HARVARD LAW REVIEW. sible, where no attempt has been made to assail it. Diers v. Mallojt, 64 N. W, Rep. 722 (Neb.). It seems fairly well settled th^t the defendant, for the purpose of showing probable cause, may introduce evidence of the general bad character of the plaintiff. Isreal V. Brooks, 23 111 575 ; Bacon v. Toiune, 4 Cush. 240 ; Mai-tin v. Hardesty, 27 Ala. 458. But there is some authority contra; Kybiirn v. Mcore, yj Tex. 85; Cireenleaf on Evi- dence, Vol. I. sec. 54, Vol. II. sec. 458. Presumably, where defendant is allowed to put in evidence of the general bad character of the plaintiff, the latter would be allowed to rebut it by evidence of general good character, though there seem to be no direct decisions on this point. In accord with the principal case are Cochran v. Taker, 14 Minn. 385; Association v. Fleming, 3 S. E. Rep. 420 (Ga.). Directly fc;//;vz is the recent case of Funk v. Amor, 7 Ohio C. C. 419, holding that the plaintiff may introduce evi- dence of his own good character in the first instance. The authorities on the question are very meagre. Life Insurance — Suicide — Insanity. — This was an action to recover on an insurance policy. The defence was suicide, and the reply insanity at the time of death. The court charged that suicide was in general a ground of forfeiture in such a case as a breach of an implied condition, and that if the man understood the wrongfulness of his acts the amount could not be recovered. The only question for the jury was "whether his mind was so impaired that he could not properly comprehend the character of the act he was about to commit. Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co, of New York, 69 Fed. Rep. 505. There is on this general question an irreconcilable conflict of opinion, but on the facts the above charge is erroneous. There was conclusive evidence to show that the deceased knew " the consequences of his deed to himself and others," and under these circumstances the decided preponderance of authority and the strongest arguments suijport the view that the company is not liable, though the insured was at the time under an insane delusion which rendered him morally and legally irresponsible. Dean V. Amcr. Mut. L. Ins. Co.^ 4 Allen, 96; St. Louis Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush, 268 ; Van Zandt v. Mttt. Ben. L. Ins. Co., 3 Ins. Law Journal, 208 ; Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 M. & G. 639. And see Bliss on the Law of Life Insurance, 2d ed., §§ 228-243. Persons — Divorce — Extreme Cruelty — Mental Suffering. — The plain- tiff petitioned for a divorce from her husband for extreme cruelty. The cruelty alleged was his commission of sodomy with a beast. Held, that such conduct was extreme cruelty, as tending to cause mental suffering that would affect the health, and exciting apprehension of the communication of disease. Divorce granted. Anonymous, 2 Ohio Nisi Pr. 342. In the absence of statutory definition, it is generally settled that cruelty sufficient to justify divorce consists of conduct that injures, or may reasonably be apprehended to injure, the physical health of the complainant. Kelly v. Kelly, L. R. 2 Prob. & Div. 31 ; Sylvis. Sylvis, 11 Col. 319; I Bish. Marr., Div. & Separ. § 1563. In some States mere mental suffering not injurious to mental or bodily health is considered sufficient. Palmer v. Palmer, 45 Mich. 150. But such doctrine is strongly denied elsewhere. Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Mass. 373- When mental suffering is so great that it may reason- ably be apprehended to produce physical ill-health, divorce ought to be granted, and it is the decision of this difficult question of fact that gives courts an opportunity to relax the spirit of the rule while following its letter. The present case, is perhaps an instance of such relaxation, and is not undesirable. But somewhat contra, see W V. IV, 141 Mass. 495. Compare Russell y. Russell, ii The Times Law Rep. 579, noticed in 9 Harvard Law Review, 222. Practice — Joint Judgment — Failure to Serve on Party — Enforce- ment. — Held, a judgment of a court of one State, rendered against three defendants jointly in an action in which one of them was not served with process, cannot be en- forced in another State by an action of debt thereon against one of the defendants who in the original action was served with process. The plaintiff who sues on a judgment must recover against all the defendants or none ; for, the judgment being an entirety, whatever constitutes a good defence for one of the defendants operates also for the benefit of the others. JPT^z/j^w v. ^/^/«a«, 33 Atl. Rep. 4 (R. I.). A glance at the authorities cited shows that the point is well settled ; in fact, no case has been found which disputes the position taken. Judgments in actions upon joint contracts are distinguished, under a local statute. Nathanson v. Spitz, 31 Atl. Rep. 690 (R. I.). Of the authorities cited in the principal case, see especially Burt v. Stevens, 22 N. H. 229; Donnelly v. Graham, -]-] Pa. St. 274; St. Louis v. Gleason, 15 Mo. App. 25. Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 N. Y. 514, contains an elaborate discussion of