Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/366

338 338 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. "Where property has been clothed with a pubhc interest, the legisla- ture may fix a limit to that which shall in law be reasonable for its use. This limit binds the courts as well as the people. If it has been improp- erly fixed, the legislature, not the courts, must be appealed to for the change." The doctrine was even more fully illustrated in Chicago, Mil- waukee, & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Ackley.^ Here, the plaintiff, a railroad company incorporated in Wisconsin, had sought to recover for the transportation of property more than the maxi- mum rate fixed by law for freight, by showing that the amount charged by the company was no more than a reasonable compen- sation for the services rendered, or, in other words, that the maxi- mum rate fixed by the State was unreasonable. But such proof was held inadmissible, upon the theory that the decision of the legislature in the premises was final. Ruggles V. Illinois ^ also is authority for a like proposition. It was there said : — "This implies that, in the absence of direct legislation on the subject, the power of the directors over the rates is subject only to the common law limitation of reasonableness, for in the absence of a statute, or other appropriate indication of the legislative will, the common law forms part of the laws of the State to which the corporate by-laws must conform. But since, in the absence of some restraining contract, the State may establish a maximum of rates to be charged by railroad companies for the transportation of persons and property, it follows that, when a maxi- mum is so established, the rates fixed by the directors must conform to its requirements, otherwise the by-laws will be repugnant to the laws." Justice Harlan concurred, but based his opinion upon other grounds, for he plainly was of opinion that the legislative deter- mination of the question of reasonableness was not properly con- clusive. Judge Field concurred, only because there was no proof made that the rate prescribed by the legislature was unreasonable, and, in the absence of proof, the presumption was that it was reasonable. Furthermore, it was decided, in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. lowa,^ that this right of regulation in the State was not lost by non-user; in Ruggles v, Illinois,^ that the grant away by a State of such a right was never to be presumed; and 1 94 U. S. 179. » 94 U. S. 155. ■« 108 U. S. 526. * 108 U. S. 526.