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290 290 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. the fact that if the mistake were known, no claim of title would be made, and too little upon the fact that in truth the c aim is made. A convincing statement of the correct view may be found in French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, and Seymour v. Carli^ 31 Minn. 81. Property — Tacking of Adverse Possessions. — Held^ that where one encloses and occupies more land than is covered by the description in his deed, and sells by the same description to another, who enters into possession of all the land enclosed, the successive possessions may be tacked to make up the period required by the Statute of Limitations. Dazockw. A'eaion^ 32 Atl. Rep. 675 (N. J.). See Notes. ■ Quasi Contracts — False Representations — Survival of Action against Executor. — Where a woman induces a man to marry her by falsely representing her- self as a single woman, his only remedy is an action of tort for the personal injury, and no action will lie against her executor on the theory of a quasi contract. In re Payne's Appeal^ 32 Atl. Rep. 948 (Conn.). i t is well settled that where a man falsely represents himself as unmarried, and thereby induces a woman to marry him, an action for deceit will not survive against his personal representative. Price v. I'rice, 75 N. Y. 244; Grimm v. Carr, 31 Pa. St. 533, Whether an action for services will survive on account of the unjust enrichment of the estate of the wrongdoer must be considered an open question. The ."-upreme Court of Massachusetts, influenced perhaps by the analogy of those cases in which it has been laid down that a disseisee cannot maintain a suit in assumpsit for mesne profits against a disseisor until he recovers the real estate by ejectment, has decided that a woman cannot sue an administrator to recover the value of services rendered to her husband's estate under the belief that she was his lawful wife, although this belief is solely in- duced by the husband's fraudulent misrepresentations. Cooper v Cooper, 147 Mass. 370. The Connecticut court accepts this line of reasoning. The contrary view is main- tained in Hi^ins v. Brcen. 9 Mo. 497, and lox v. Dawson, 8 Martin, 94. There would seem to be small difficulty on principle in allowing a recovery to the extent to which the estate of the tortfeasor has been benefited. The fraud of the deceased has caused the ignorance of the facts, and if the injured party chooses to ignore the personal injury and sue for the unjust enrichment, he should be allowed to do so. Keener on (^uasi Contracts, p. 321 et seq. Sales — Factors Acts. — He'd, that the word *' sale" in Massachusetts Factors Act does not include a completed sale, and that where there is larceny there can be no "intrusting" within the meaning of the act. Prentice Co. v. Page, 41 N, E. Rep. 279 (Mass.). See Notes. Sales — When Title Passes. — C, a hotel proprietor, ordered of plaintiff two settees to be manufactured by the latter ; when finished plaintiff delivered them to C. There was no agreement as to the time of payment. C. before paying plaintiff sold to defendant, and plaintiff brought replevin against defendant. The presiding justice in his instructions practically directed a vdidict for plaintiff. Defendant brings excep- tions. Held, sustaining exceptions that the presumption is that the parties intended to make payment and delivery concurrent conditions If vendor waives the condition of payment, title vests in the endee ; delivery without payment is evidence of a waiver, and it should be left to he jury whether there was such a waiver. Geo, IV, Merrill lu-tutvre Co. v. //ill, 2,2 Atl. R^p. 71. (Me). The decision itself is undoubtedly correct, but the language of the court is, to say the least, loose. The error is in regarding the payment as presumably a condition pre- cedent to the passing of title, when it is only a condition precedent to delivery, and a waiver of it has no effect on title In case of goods to be manufactured, presum- ably title passes upon appropriation and acceptance. Wil/iins.Bro7n/iead, 6M. & G. 963; Smit/i v. Edwards, 156 Mass. 221. Some authorities seem to say that title passes as soon as the things is finished. Goddard v. Binney, 115 Mass. 450; 2 Kent's Comm. if the goods are put into the hands of the buyer, it seems a sound doctrine that there is presumably a waiver of the condition, Upton v. Sturhridge Cofton Mills., in Mass. it^ Has/zinsy. Warren, 115 Mass. 514; Comtry. Cunning/iam, jy N. Y. 391. The doctrine that in a cash sale presumably title does not pass till cash is paid, Paulv. Keed, 52 N. H. 13^. fa doctrine denied by Blackburn so far as mercantile transactions go,) is generally applied whe e the contract is for the sale of specific goods, rather than of goods to be manufactured. Tors — Death by Wrongful Act — Contributory Negligence of Sole Beneficiary. — Held, that where a father sues as administrator to recover for death
 * 504. A condition may go either to title or to delivery, but even where it goes to title,