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276 276 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. to the Factors Acts, — an opposition which crops out in almost every case on the subject, and of which Prentice Co.y. Page (41 N. E. R. 279), a Massachusetts case, furnishes an example. A swindler, by false repre- sentations and forged certificates (arts which subsequently secured his conviction for larceny), managed to obtain goods from the Prentice Com- pany, which he palmed off upon a purchaser for value without notice. Tnis result he had accomplished by assuring the Preniice Company that he had already made contracts for the goods as their agent, apd that he wished simply to complete the sales by dehvery. Under these circum- stiices, and under a Factors Act that protected purchasers from agents " intrusted with the possession of merchandise or of a bill of lading, con- signing merchandise to him for the purpose of sale," the court decided that the word '' sale " did not include a completed sale, and that a man intrusted with goods for the purpose of fulfilling a contract of sale was not a man intrusted " for the purpose of sale." In England in Bainesw. Swainson (4 B. & S. 27) and Shcpardv. Bank (7 H. & N. 661), the opposite result was reached. The court attempts to distinj^uish these cases by pointing out that in the English Factors Acts the provision is simply that the goods shall be " intrusted," and not, the court says, " as ours, * intrusted for sale.' " It is noticeable, however, that in the Massachusetts act the phrase " for the purpose of sale " occurs only in connection with the bill of lading, and not with the merchandise. The court then tries to discredit Baines v. Swainson by quoting Black- burn, J., in Cole v. Bank (L. R. 10 C. P. 354, 373, 374), to the effect that Willes, J. in delivering judgment in Buentesv. Montis (L. R. 3 C. P. 268), " speaks of Baines v. Swainson as going to the extreme of the law." Yet on page 280 of L. R. 3 C. P. Willes, J. says, "The case of Baines y, Swainson, to which I entirely assent." Another ground on which the court rests its decision is the larceny by the agent. " It would be a contradiction in terms to say that goods are intrusted for sale to one who steals them." That, however, is by no means perfectly clear. Larceny by trick is not at all inconsistent with persuading the owner to intrust goods to a rascal. The crime or fraud m:«y render the guilty party punishable ; but as Martin, B. said, in answer to a simiUr position taken in Shepard v. Bank (7 H. & N. 661, at 665), " he does not, however, the less intrust." Looked at from the point of view of this anomalous species of larceny, this ratio decidendi also seems hardly satisfactory. Admission to the Bar. — The General Council of the Quebec Bar is considering the advisability of admitting to practice, without exam- ination, all who present diplomas from any law school in the Province. This suggests the query as to whether such a scheme is likely ever to secure general adoption. Perhaps it may not be universally known that in several of our States it already prevails. In Louisiana, Missis- sippi, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, the diploma of the law department of the State University is acceped in lieu of examination ; in Georgia, two law schools are thus recognized ; while in Illinois and Tennessee diplomas from any law school in the State, and in Indiana from any law school whatever, entitle their holders to admission to the bar. There is doubtless much to be said both for and against this policy. One who recalls the weeks of laborious memorizing, terminating in the severe mental strain of many consecutive hours of thinking and writing