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239 CONSIDERATIONS MOVING FROM THIRD PERSONS. 239 without any promise ; while still others consider that the mort- gagor, when receiving the promise, acts as agent for the mortgagee, which act the latter may, and by bringing the action does, ratify and adopt. But none of them seem to deny the liability of the grantee to an action by his grantor to whom the promise is made, and from whom alone the consideration is received ; and this view seems to leave the grantee liable to as many actions as there are creditors of the grantor whom he has agreed to pay. Some of the cases sustaining such actions are Burr. v. Beers ; ^ Thompson v. Thompson ;^ Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co. ;^ Merriman v. Moore ^ Urquhart v. Bray ton ;^ Miller v. Billingway ; ^ Wood v. Moriarty ; '' Crawford v. Edwards ;^ Booth v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co.^ There are several classes of cases, sometimes cited as supporting actions by a mere beneficiary, but which when carefully examined fall quite short of affirming such to be the general rule. 1. The first is where the consideration is advanced by and the promise is made to a third person, who is acting as agent or on be- half of the plaintiff, either known or not known to be such agent ; for in such cases the consideration is in legal contemplation ad- vanced by the plaintiff himself, and the promise is made to him.^^ Some early cases seem to have held that a near relationship be- tween the promisee and the plaintiff, such as father and son, would sufficiently constitute an agency, so that the action might be main- tained by the son upon a promise made to the father.^^ The modern view, however, is that such relationship does not, in and of itself, create an agency, and is at most only a circumstance tending to show an actual agency, and that something more must be shown than mere relationship to vary the rule applied in other cases.^^ 2. The second is where the plaintiff furnished some part of the consideration, and shared also in the promise ; as where a debtor transfers all his property to a third person, who agrees with him and his creditors that he will pay the grantor's debts to them, and they assent to it, and discharge the original debtor ; no doubt such creditors can recover of the promisor, for they part with a consider- I24N. Y. 178. * 95. Pa. St. 78. '15R. I. 578. 2 4 Ohio St. 333. 6 12 R. I. 169. 8 .^ ^lich. 385. » 48 N. Y. 253. 8 41 Ind. 489. 9 43 Mich. 299 " See Carnegie v. Waugh, 2 D. & R. 277 (1823) ; Hubbert v. Borden, 6 Whart. 79 1840); Barry v. Page, 10 Gray, 398 (1858) ; Ford v. Williams, 21 How. 287 (1S58). 11 Dutton V, Poole, 2 Lev. 210 (1677) ; Felton v. Dickinson, 10 Mass. 287 (181 3). " Tweddle v. Atkinson, i B. & S. 396; Marston v. Bigelow, 150 Mass. 45; Wilbur v.