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223 RECENT CASES. 223 Rigby^s dissenting opinion is a strong argument for a relaxation of the doctrine, on the ground that a series of verbal indignities are capable of amounting to legal cruelty, independently of violence. In United States many of the courts have broken away from the physical injury test, and have granted relief in cases where there was no actual violence, by a more liberal interpretation of legal " cruelty." Kosenfeld v. Rosen- feld, 40 Pac. Rep. 49 (Col.) (Mere words) ; Barries v. Barnts^ 95 Cal. 171 (Facts almost identical with principal case) ; Straus v. Straus^ 67 Hun, 491 ; Palmer v. Palmer^ 45 Mich. 150 ; Scoliiid v. Scoland, 4 Wash. 118. See also Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N. H. 6oo, for a very able review of the subject by Judge Carpenter. Persons — Marriage of Slaves — Effect of Emancipation. — Plaintiff and one Henrietta Coleman, while slaves, began living together as husband and wife, a valid marriage being prohibited to them. After emancipation, they continued to co- habit until the death of the wife in 1894, but no legal marriage ceremony was ever performed. Before Henrietta's death she conveyed to defendant certain property, in executing the deeds of which plaintiff had not joined. He sued to recover this prop- erty. Beld^ plaintiff and his wife by continuing to cohabit after emancipation ratified the marriage relation, of which they were before legally incapable, and thus established a valid marriage between themselves. The wife was then incapable of conveying real estate alone. Coleman v. Vollmer^ 31 S. W. Rep. 413 (Tex.). This decision is in strict accordance with the opinion of Mr, Bishop (i Bishop, Mai., Div., and Sep., §§ 660-669), who thinks that a slave marriage, being deemed good by custom so far as it did not conflict with the master's rights, could be affirmed or disaffirmed by the parties without further formality when emancipated. North Caro- lina is the only State in which a different view has been upheld. Howard v. Ho-ivard^ 6 Jones, 235. Property — Accretions — Demurrer upon Evidence. — Plaintiff's land was a government patent bordering on the Missouri River. The river gradually changed its course until the main channel flowed over what had once been the plaintiff's land. An island then formed within the original limits of the patent. Held, on demurrer upon evidence that plaintiff had no title to the island. (Brace, C. J., dissenting.) Co^. v. Arnold, 31 S. W. Rep. 592 (Mo.). This seemingly harsh case finds its explanation in the rule that in the large western rivers the fee in the bed belongs to the State, and that adjacent land granted by the United States is bounded by the bank of the river. As all gradual accretions to the bank would accrue to the benefit of the riparian owner, he must take the opposite risk and yield to the State the fee of land gradually submerged. An island formed over this new bed would come within the general rule as to islands in navigable western streams, and would go to the State. Gould on Waters, §§ 42, 76. Property — Boundaries — Courses and Distances. — The decision in an ac- tion of ejectment depended on the construction of a deed granting 10,240 acres, describing the boundaries as follows : " Beginning at a birch-tree and running south 360 chains to a stake supposed to be in D's line, and thence ..." If the line was run south 360 chains, it would still be one mile and a quarter from D's line, where the stake was supposed to be. Held, the line should not be extended, but stop at a dis- tance of 360 chains from the birch-tree. Brown v. House, 21 S. E. Rep. 938 (N. C). The decision seems sound. The court admits that natural objects or monuments govern courses and distances as a general rule, but say that the reason of the rule fails to apply here as the monument, " a stake supposed to be in D's line, " is too indefinite, and would call for too great an extension of the line from the birch-tree. 1 hey also give weight to the fact that the area will be much nearer 10,240 acres if the course and distance govern. Ihis is an arjiument for allowing course and distance to prevail, especially where the boundaries are as doubtful as in the case at bar. 3 Gray's Cases on Prop., 285, et seq. Property — Eminent Domain — Public Use. — Plaintiff railway company sought to condemn, for its proposed road-bed, an unused portion of defendant rail- road company's right of way. The proposed railroad, when built, would be used mainly by a few mine-owners, and but little by the public in general. From a judg- ment below, in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Held, under the Constitution, Art. 15, § 5, the proposed road would be a public carrier, and the public would, there- fore, have a right to use its facilities; the character of a road, whether public or private, is to be determined by the extent of the right to use it, and not by the extent to which that right will be exercised. B., A. dr» P. Ry. Co. v. Montana Union Iy. Co., 41 Pac. Rep. 232 (Montana). The point here decided is well established. Randolph on Eminent Domain, § 56 ; Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 171. The opinion contains a rather interesting discus-