Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/237

209 POLLOCK V. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY. 209 The question therefore arises what is the limited meaning of the words in the Constitution ? It seems apparent on the face of the Constitution that the framers of it meant to indicate specifically all the different methods and forms of taxation, and to prescribe the manner in which each should be collected. Excises have been levied and collected according to the rule of uniformity, regardless of the fact that they were also direct taxes. It is strange that the form of direct taxation which was then most common and best known — namely, taxation of land — should not have been named or referred to. Indeed, it seems to have been almost the only subject of direct taxation by the States.^ It is hardly possible that it could have escaped the attention of the Constitutional Convention, and it is conceded upon all hands that a direct tax upon land must be apportioned. If it be true, as is stated by Mr. Chief Justice Chase in Veazie Bank v. Fenno,^ that in many, if not all, of the Southern States slaves were considered and held to be real property,^ it follows that direct taxes on slaves would have to be apportioned. If there be validity in this suggestion, which seems to have escaped the notice of the learned counsel who argued the cause, and of all the members of the Court, we find again in this curious provision with regard to "direct taxes " the evasion of the Constitution as to slavery. But, if this be not so, and slaves were considered to be personalty, as seems to have been the case in the five original slave States, except Virginia,* still slaves are denominated as " persons " in the Constitution, and as such are clearly subject to capitation taxes, Veazie Bank v. Fenno, ^ which must also be apportioned. Indeed, no tax upon slaves is conceivable that is not a capitation tax, unless it be a license tax. And this suggestion is borne out strikingly by the early statutes of the United States, which levied ' 158 U. S. 686 ; 158 U.S. 699 ; 158 U.S. 701. ^ 158 U.S. 650. 2 8 Wall. 533,543. Parker Hall. See also Stat. 1727, c. 11, § 3. 4 Hen. 222. Slaves were declared to be personal- property in South Carolina by Stat. 1740; 3S.C Stat at T,arge. 568^ and in Georgia by Stat. 1770, c. 203, § i;Dig. Laws of Georgia, 163. Apparently there was no legisla- tion on the subject in Maryland or North Carolina, at least neither Mr. Hall nor I have be-n able to find any. While there is no direct adjudication upon the point in either of these two latter States, the cases seem to assume that slaves were chattels. See I Hurd's Law of Freedom and Bondage, chap, vi., p. 222. 5 8 Wall. 533, 543. 2^
 * I am indebed for the greater part of the material for this note to Mr. James
 * Slaves were made real property in Virginia by Stat. 1705, c. 23,§ i. 3 Hen. 333.