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202 202 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. as to ratio might be retained, while the mode of collection was changed." ^ 'The reasons for the clauses of the Constitution in respect of direct taxation are not far to seek. The States, respect- ively, possessed plenary powers of taxation. They could tax the property of their citizens in such manner and to such extent as they saw fit; they had unrestricted powers. . . . They gave up the great sources of revenue derived from commerce ; they retained the concurrent power or [of] levying excises, and duties if covering anything other than excises ; but in respect of them the range of taxation was narrowed by the power granted over interstate com- merce, and by the danger of being put at disadvantage in dealing with excises on manufactures. They retained the power of direct taxation, and to that they looked as their chief resource ; but even in respect of that, they granted the concurrent power, and if the tax were placed by both governments on the same subject, the claim of the United States had preference. Therefore, they did not grant the power of direct. taxation without regard to their own condition and resources as States." ^ "The founders anticipated that the expenditures of the States, their counties, cities, and towns, would chiefly be met by direct taxation on accumulated property, while they expected that those of the Federal govern- ment would be for the most part met by indirect taxes. And in order that the power of direct taxation by the general government should not be exercised, except on necessity ; and, when the neces- sity arose, should be so exercised as to leave the States at liberty to discharge their respective obligations, and should not be so exercised, unfairly and discriminatingly, as to particular States or otherwise, by a mere majority vote, possibly of those whose con- stituents were intentionally not subjected to any part of the burden, the qualified grant was made." ^ " We find it impossible to hold that a fundamental requisition, deemed so important as to be enforced by two provisions, one aflfirmative and one negative, can be refined away by forced distinctions between that which gives value to property, and the property itself. Nor can we perceive any ground why the same reasoning does not apply to capital in personalty held for the purpose of income or ordmarily yielding income, and to the income therefrom." * " Nor are we impressed with the contention that, because in the four instances in which 1 158 u. S. 619. * 158 u. s. 621. 3 158 u. s. 620. * 158 u. s. 628.