Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/209

181 UNIVERSITY TEACHING OF ENGLISH LAW, iSi student's work, but lightens the daily drudgery of the bench and bar. The true nature of equitable rights and remedies ; the doc- trine of equitable defences ; the history and analysis of the law of Contract, Torts, Trusts, and Evidence ; the nature and true theory of the negotiability of obligations ; the nature of the Common Law itself ; the whole doctrine of Quasi-Contract ; the doctrine of Per- petuities, — these things make only a part of this material. As I said, I do not speak of work done at any one institution or in any one part of the country merely. But now suppose some one says. What is the use of carrying on our backs all this enormous load of the Common Law t Let us codify, and be rid of all this by enacting what we need, and re- pealing the rest. Well, I am not going to discuss codification. There is not time for that. And the word is an ambiguous one ; some good things and some bad ones are called by this name. I will only say that as yet we do not well understand our law ; it is our first duty to understand it. The effort to codify it, or systematically to restate it for purposes of legislation, — for any purpose other than a merely academic one, — should come later, if it come at all. To codify what is only half understood is to perpetuate a mass of errors and shallow ambiguities ; it is to begin at the wrong end. Let us, first of all, thoroughly know our ground. I can say this with confi- dence, that as regards one or two departments of law with which I have a considerable acquaintance, I have never seen any attempt at codification, here or abroad, which was not plainly marked by grave and disqualifying defects. Good-will, strong general capacity, courage, sense, practical gifts, are indeed not wanting in some of these attempts ; but a competent knowledge of the subject is wanting. My honored friend, Judge Dillon, in his excellent address last year, said a word or two in connection with this subject which should be supplemented, I think, by a word or two more. In speaking of law reforms, he remarked that " no mere doctrinaire or closet student of our technical system of law is capable of wise and well- directed efforts to amend it. This must be the work of practical lawyers. " If the expression " mere doctrinaire or closet student " refers to any class of pedants and incompetent persons who do not appreciate the nature of what they are studying, I should not wish to qualify that portion of the remark just quoted which reaches them. But if it may be supposed to allude to the class of legal