Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/110

82 $2 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. am responsible for whatever results from the wrongful contact. If by a mere unlawful touch I cause death or severe bodily harm to another (by reason, for example, of his delicate state of health), I am hable for the result either civilly^ or criminally.^ If I wrong- fully cause A to put ketchup in a cask which has contained tur- pentine (though I do not know and have no reason to suspect that fact), I am responsible for the harm done to the ketchup by the combination.^ If I throw into the ocean a box belonging to A, which I have every reason to suppose empty, but there is hidden in it a purse of gold which is lost, I am liable for the loss.* 2. We mean by an act, in this use of the word, the whole com- bination of circumstances, the resultant of which is the harm com- plained of In all cases of personal injury or direct injury to property, the act is the physical contact between the person or property injured and the outside force. It is immaterial which element of the com- bination is the active one. My act is the same, whether I thrust a sharp stick into A, or fix the stick, and cause A to run upon it;^ whether I pour water over him, or cause him to jump into a river ;^ whether I pack him in ice and salt, or cause him to be exposed to the freezing air;'^ whether I throw him upon a pile of bricks, or by removing a staging cause a load of bricks to fall upon him.^ My act in these cases is not fastening the stick, inducing the man to jump, turning him out of doors, or removing the staging; it is bringing into contact with the man's body the stick, water, cold air, and bricks respectively. If I so negligently manage a vessel of which I am master as to run down and sink another vessel and drown a passenger in it, my act of injury is not the mismanage- ment of my vessel, but the fatal contact between the passenger and the ocean. My negligence is important only in determining whether I am responsible for that contact.^ 1 Tice z/. Munn, 94 N. Y. 621; Brown v. C. M. & S. P. Ry., 54 Wis. 342; i Sedg. Dam. § 112. 2 State V. O'Brien, 81 la. 88, Beale Cas. Crim. L. 433. 8 Cunnington v. Great Northern Ry., 49 L. T. Rep. 392. 6 See Reg. v. Martin, 8 Q. B. D. 54. 6 See Reg. v. Pitts, C. & Marsh. 284. ■^ See Hendrickson v. Com., 85 Ky. 281, Beale Cas. Crim. L. 430. 9 See a confusion on this point in the minds of some of the court in Reg. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, 66, 150, 232; Beale Cas. Crim. L. 897, 915.
 * Eten V. Luyster, 60 N. Y. 252, Smith Cas. Torts, 55.
 * See Reg. v. Hughes, 7 Cox C. C. 301, 26 L. J. M. C. 202.