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60 60 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. offence, not being ousted by Rev. St. U. S. § 711, giving to the United States courts exclusive jurisdiction over crimes cognizable under authority of the United States. People v. Welch, 36 N. E. Rep. 328 (N. Y.). This affirms 26 N. Y. Supp. 694. Section 711 is construed to refer only to offences against the United States which are not offences against the State, while section 5328 reserves to the State courts concurrent jurisdiction over the act if it constitute at once an offence against the United States and against the State. This construction seems best, to reconcile the sections concerned. Equity — Copyright — Authority of Equitable Part-Owner. — Suit in equity to restrain defendant from prosecuting an action at law for infringement of a copyright. Defendant Falk, a photographer, had taken the photograph of an actress, as a public person in costume, and copyrighted it, the understanding being that the actress was to have as many pictures, free of charge, as she desired, to do with as she chose. At the request of the orator, the actress gave the orator several of these photo- graphs, which he published in his paper, with her consent, but without the consent of defendant, who brought an action at law against him, under Rev. St. U. S. § 4965, which imposes a penalty for publishing copies of any copyrighted work without the consent of the proprietor first obtained in writing, signed in the presence of two witnesses. Held, no right to the orator as a defence in equity not available in law, and he must therefore be left to make his defence at law. Press Pub. Co. v. Falk, 59 Fed. Rep. 324 (N. Y.). The orator contended that the actress, although not the legal owner of the copy- right, had a beneficial right in it sufficient to authorize her to permit the publishing of the copies. The court disposed conclusively of this contention by saying that even were it sound, yet, as her consent was not in writing and attested as required by the statute, it was of no effect. The court intimate that if the actress had so procured the publi- cation of the article containing the copies, it would have been hers, and that her equitable right would doubtless have protected her and others employed by her; citing Laurence v. Dana, 2 Amer. Law T. Rep. (N. s.) 402. Equity — Injunction Restraining Removal of County Seat. — In this case a taxpayer, owning large property interests in the vicinity, instituted proceedings in equity to restrain the removal of the county seat, on the ground of fraud in the election, which resulted in favor of such removal. There was no statutory authority for legal intervention. Held, by the majority of the court, that the orator had no such iriterest in the subject-matter as gave him a standing in the court, and that, in the absence of statute, the court could not interfere (see 35 Pac. Rep. 586). Stiles and Hoyt, JJ., dis- sented to both propositions, and the present report contains a lengthy dissenting opin- ion by the former, with a full citation of authorities. Parmeter v. Bourne et al., 35 Pac. Rep. 586, 757 (Wash.). Evidence — Criminal Acts other than those Charged. — On the trial of defendant for the murder of an infant which he had received from its mother upon an agreement to adopt it, it was shown in evidence that he had received other infants upon similar agreements, and that several infants had been found buried in his garden, where the infant for whose murder he was being tried, was found. Held, that this evidence was admissible, being relevant to show that this particular act complained of was designed and not accidental. Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894], App. Cas. 57 (Eng.). The doctrine of the case is similar to that of Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571. These cases show the incorrectness of the oft-quoted statement that in a trial for one crime, evidence of other crimes committed by defendant cannot be given. Such evidence is clearly admissible when restricted to its proper use. For a somewhat ex- treme application of this doctrine, see Frazer v. State, 34 N. E. Rep. 817 (Ind). See also 7 Harvard Law Review, 309. Evidence — Judicial Notice. — On an appeal from a decision declaring a con- tract void, as in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, — Held, that as Kansas City and Wichita were large and universally known commercial centres of the country, the court would take judicial notice of their geographical location, and that transportation by railroad from those places was over lines outside the State of New York. Parks y. Jacob Dold Packing Co., z-j N. Y. Supp. 289. The above case is undoubtedly in accordance with the law. It is to be distinguished from the case of Kearney v. King, 2 V>. & Aid. 301, decided in the Court of King's Pench in 1819, and the class represented thereby. For in that case, the refusal of the court to take judicial notice of the fact that a bill of exchange, headed " Dublin, May 1st, i8i6," was drawn at Dublin in Ireland, was on the ground that the court could not