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490 490 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. being the heir-at-law] who shall have any estate by the settlement of the intestate, or shall be advanced by the intestate in his life- time by portion or portions equal to the share which shall by such distribution be allotted to the other children to whom such dis- tribution is to be made. And in case any child other than the heire-at-law who shall have any estate 'by settlement from the said intestate or shall be advanced by the said intestate in his life- time by portion not equall to the share which will be due to the other children by such distribution,. ., then so much ... to be distributed to such childe or children ... as shall make the estate of all the said children to be equall." In interpreting this section the English courts have had occasion to lay down certain rules for determining what allowances or gifts made by a parent in his lifetime to his children are to be regarded as advancements. These principles are well stated in Boyd v. Boyd, L. R. 4 Eq. Cas. 305 (1867), and Taylor v. Taylor, 20 Eq. Cas. 155 (1875). In the first case Page Wood, V. C, said, "In short, whatever sum is paid for a particular purpose which is thought good and right by the father, and which the son him- self desires, if it be money which is drawn out in considerable amount, and not a small sum, it must be treated as an advance- ment." In the later case (Taylor v. Taylor) Jessel, M. R., com- menting on this exposition of Vice Chancellor Wood, said that by child in life, like a marriage portion. Accordingly he held that the following payments were advancements, viz., (i) an admission fee to the Inns of Court; (2) the price of a commission and outfit of a child entering the army; (3) cost of a " plant" and machinery to start a son in business. But he held that the payment of an army officer's debts, and an annual allowance to a clergyman for house- hold expenses, were not advancements.^ These remarks show clearly enough that stipends for mainten- ance payable out of income are not advancements, in the absence of evidence of direct intention to make them so ; and the general inquiry clearly is, what is it reasonable to infer from the mere fact of a gift of the kind under the given circumstances? It is difficult to understand why the same test should not be applied in dealing 1 See also the note to Pusey v. Desbouvrie, 3 P. Wms. p. 316; Swinb. Pt. 3, § 18, pi. 19; Bac. Abr. tit. Executors and authorities in last American ed. of Williams on Executors.
 * particular purpose " was meant something given to establish the