Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/447

431 RECENT CASES. 43 1 the reason of the role, and that the rule should end ; but they refused to take this step. 97 Mass. 547 ; id. 225-229. Under the statute in the principal case it seems plainer, however, that the legislature did not intend the old presumption to continue. Property — Accession. — The plaintiffs made and baled hay on the defendant's land, under a bona fide claim of right. The defendant interfered with its removal, and the plaintiffs bring replevin. Hild, that since the plaintiffs took the grass in good faith, and greatly increased its value, the defendant making no effort to stop them, the title has changed, and the defendant is left to his action for the value of the grass. Carpen- ter v. Linge7ifelter, 60 N. V. Rep. 1022 (Neb.). The court follow the decision in Wetlierhee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, making a great change in value sufficient to pass title, though there has been no such change in sub- stance as was required by the old rule of accession. The other cases cited, while in form actions of replevin, were in fact for damages only, and hence are not authorities for this decision. The earlier Nebraska case. Baker v. Meisch, 29 Neb. 227, involved a change from clay to bricks, which might well go upon the stricter rule, so that Wether- bee V. Green is the only case directly in point. The court dwell ui)on the fact of good faith, which it would seem should not affect the question of title at all. Property — Adverse Possession — Notice. — Tenant for years remained in pos" session after the end of the term, and received a deed of the land from one claiming title under a tax sale. He continued in possession as before, and in suit to quiet title set up this possession under the deed as adverse to his lessor and those claimuig from him. Held, that the mere recording of the deed was not notice to the lessor, but that there must be some unequivocal act to mark a change in the character of the posses- sion before the statute would begin to run. Millett v. Lagomarsino, 38 Fac. Rep. 308 (Cab). The case is right. The doctrine of constructive notice from recording deed cannot apply in such a case, and knowledge of the claim of right must be brought to the land- lord by some act inconsistent with the tenancy. Property — Bailment — Es-toppel. — G. having sugar warehoused with defend- ants, arranged that they should hold it subject to the order of F. F. sold to plaintiffs, who had defendants transfer the sugar to them on the warehouse books. The fraud of F. appearing, G. persuaded defendants to refuse the goods on the ]ilaintiffs' demand. Held, that defendants were estopped to deny the plaintiffs' title, and liable for a con- version accordingly. Henderson v. IVilliams, 29 L. J. 766; 11 The Times Law Rep. 148. See Notes. Property — Eminent Domain — Conflicting Public Uses. — Held,that land owned by a street-railway company, and used by it as a horse barn and a warehouse for property used in its business of public carrier, but on which it has no tracks, may be condemned by an elevated railroad comjjany for its right of way. Chicago IV. D. Ry. Co. v. Metropolitan W. S. El. K. K. Co., 38 N. E. Rep. 736 (111.). The court seem to make this case turn on whether the property condemned would include tracks used as rights of way by the defendant. It is submitted that this is not the true test, but that a sounder rule is laid down in C. W. &= M. R. R. Co. v. City of Anderson, 38 N. E. Rep. 167 (Ind.), where it was held that buildings used by a railroad in the operation of its road could not be condemned, even for a highway. For com- ment on that case and authorities, see 8 Harvard Law Review, 289. Property — Legacy to Charitable Institutions — Cy-pres. — The testator's will contained a clause worded thus: "I give the following charitable legacies." Here follows a number of legacies to charitable institutions, among which is this one, on which the action is founded : " to the rector for the time being of St. Thomas Sem- inary, for the education of priests in the diocese of Westminster, for the purposes of such seminary, ;^5,ooo." St. Thomas Seminary was an existing institution when the Will was made, but was dissolved previous to the death of the testator. The question _ before the court was whether the legacy to it lapsed, or might by cy-pres be applied to ' other charities. Held, by the Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment below, that the legacy lapsed, since the object of the bequest had ceased to exist, and cy-pres could not be applied because the intent of the testator was to give the legacy not to charity in general, but to the particular institution known as St. Thomas Seminary. In Re Rymer, Rymer v. Staiifield, L. R. [1895] i Ch. D. 19. There is no doubt of the correctness of the rule of law here laid down, though con- sidering the terms of the will and the well known liberality with which the doctrine of cy-pres is applied, one is surprised that the court did not find that the main object of the bequest was a general charitable purpose. See Gray's Rule against Perpetuities, § 607. 57