Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/235

219 REMOTENESS OF CHARITABLE GIFTS. 219 ship shall vest within a certain limit, and in not applying this rule to charity Lord Cottenham erred. The fact that the property remains in the charity forever is no reason why the rule should not apply. The gift to the charity should be regarded at any one moment, as the gift to the individual is regarded ; in the latter, the rule does not permit a future interest so remote and uncertain in value to hamper a present ownership, and it is quite clear, on principle and authority, that the same rule should apply to the charitable gift. If a fund given to charity can, at some very dis- tant period of time, be taken from that charity, then the healthy and natural growth of that charity is just as much checked as would be the growth of the individual under similar conditions. The law has said this shall not take place in the case of the individual, and the logic and consistency of the law demand that the charity shall be governed by the same rule. In conclusion, I will add that it may be urged against my argument that it consists simply of an attempt to explain the meaning of Lord Cottenham's words. I am willing to plead guilty to this indictment, for is it not, in a great measure, the life-work of us lawyers to explain the meaning of our judges, — to seek exactly their use of words, — to distinguish or apply, to extend or qualify just what they have said, — in short, to reconcile, and if possible always to reconcile, their words with the principle involved? Richard Mason Lisle,