Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/231

215 REMOTENESS OF CHARITABLE GIFTS. 21$ must always be held for the charitable purposes. The charity ownership was qualified ; it could never deal with the property as an individual owner in fee could deal with his own property, hence in this higher sense the property was " inalienable." In a gift of stock, or in bond, cannot the charity dispose of (alienate) the bond or stock, and make a good title thereto? but, on the con- trary, is it not the chief characteristic of this gift that the money, stock, or bond is still an " inalienable " gift, in that it is given in perpetuity, and the charity cannot dispose of the fund in any way it may see fit? As for myself, I have not a doubt that, in speak- ing of a gift to charity, I could use, as Lord Cottenham used,i;he word " inalienable," and mean exactly what I have said above; and I feel quite sure, if my readers will only ask themselves the question, they will find that they too, very readily, could use the word in the way I think Lord Cottenham has done. It seems absurd to me to make the rule depend on the possi- bility of being able to make a conveyance, and I cannot believe that Lord Cottenham understood the rule in any such way. He. uses the word " inalienable," it may be, perhaps, carelessly, but he never meant to confine the word to its strict technical meaning; and this, I think, for the reason that the mere lack of power of alienation, in the sense of the right to make title, is one of the minor characteristics of the rule, whilst its chief characteristic consists in the lack of the power of alienation, in the sense of the right of complete disposal, whether the gift consists of money, stock, bond, or land. II. Lord Cottenham, whilst using the word " inalienable," as I have just explained, and whilst perfectly familiar with the principle in the rule, yet, as frequently happens with all of us, has erred in applying the principle in Christ's Hospital v. Granger. I think it may be seen from his own words how he has been led astray: " If the Corporation of Reading might hold the property for certain charities in Reading, why may not the Corporation of London hold it for the Charity of Christ's Hospital in London? " And he thought it could, because the property is not rendered '* inalien- able " by the transfer, in a certain event, of property from one charity to another. He reasoned in this way: As a charity may be created to exist forever, so property may be given to it in
 * ^ 100,000 of personal property to charity, whether in money, in