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198 198 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. sued, in his own name and on his own responsibility there must be something exceptional about him. Undischarged bankrupts, for example, are not a very large proportion of our adult population. But at Rome in the time of Cicero, or even of the Antonines, a prudent man could not presume anything about a stranger's legal capacities. A person of respectable appearance who spoke Latin was not necessarily even free. We know that serious doubt whether a man was free or not was quite possible. If he was a slave, he had no legal rights ; he was not a person at all in the eye of the law. If he was free, he might still be a freed man, or a foreigner (not to speak of minuter distinctions). If he was a Roman citizen he might still have a father living, and be under that father's power; again, he might have been emancipated or adopted. He might belong in short to any one of several conditions of men, each having its distinct and proper measure of legal capacities. For a Roman of the Republic, and even of the Empire down to Justinian's time and later, the question, " With what kind of person have I to do? " had a very clear and prominent legal meaning, and no question could be more practical. Modern authors have not arrived at any general agreement either as to the precise meaning of the law relating to persons in the Roman classification (if indeed the meaning ever was pre- cise), or as to what topics are conveniently included under such a head at the present day. There is, however, a general tendency to regard the law "of persons as supplementary to the general body of legal rules. We are apt to ask first, not what are the respective capacities of the parties in the matter in hand, but what are the rights of the matter assuming all parties to be of full ability. Then we consider, as a possible accident in the case, whether anyone is under any disability, or to any extent exempt from responsibility, by reason of some special personal condition. In books meant for practical use this method is commonly fol- lowed, the disabilities and immunities of infants, married women, and so forth, being explained with reference to the department of law or class- of transactions which is the subject of exposition. Another principle of division frankly based on convenience of exposition is that by which, in dealing either with a whole body of law or with a substantial department thereof, those principles and rules which are found in all or most portions of the subject, so that they may be said to run through it, are disposed of before the several branches are entered upon. Such principles and rules may relate to the nature of duties and rights in themselves, to the con-