Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/118

102 102 HARVARD LAW RE VIE IV. made by A to B for a good consideration to pay B's debt to C, C may sue A." This was not supported by authority at the time nor necessary to the decision, but it has since been copied from one text-book to another, and quoted in the cases until it has begun to bear the appearance of authority in itself; but in Crowe v. Rogers,^ decided a few years afterward, this doctrine was distinctly repudiated. The plaintiff had a claim against H for a debt of £yo. The defendant promised H that if he would make a title for him he would pay the plaintiff the £^0. On demurrer to a declaration alleging these facts it was held that the plaintiff could not recover, because the consideration moved from H, and not from the plaintiff. This was approved and followed in Price v. Easton.^ The declara- tion stated that W. P. owed the plaintiff ;^i 3, and that it was agreed between W. P. and the defendant that if the defendant would work for him and leave his wages in his hands, he the defendant would pay the plaintiff the money due to him from W, P. ; and there was an averment that W. P. had performed his part of the agreement. After a verdict for the plaintiff, judgment was arrested, and Lit- tledale, J., said, " This case is precisely like Crowe v. Rogers, I Strange, 592, and must be governed by it." In Williams v. Everett,^ where bills were remitted from the Cape of Good Hope to the defendants in London, to be paid in certain sums to various persons, and the defendants declined to hold the money for the purpose, but did in fact collect the money, it was held that an action would not lie against them by the persons to whom the money was to be paid. It was open to the remitter to countermand the order until the receiver had made some engage- ment with the person to whom the money was to be paid ; but in Lilly V. Hayes,* where the receiver of the money admitted that he held it to the plaintiff's use, and the plaintiff by his authority was notified of this, it was held that the plaintiff might recover the money from him in an action for money had and received, and that he could not allege want of consideration moving from the plaintiff. In this case the defendant had actually made himself the agent or banker of the plaintiff, and the right of action arose out of this relation of trust and not out of any promise made to another.^ 1 I Strange, 592 (1724). « 14 East, 582 (1811). 2 B. & Ad. 433. * 5 A. & E. 584 (1826). and similar cases, see the notes to Lampleigh v. Brathwait, i Smith Ldg. Cas. 271 and
 * With reference to the distinction between Lilly v. Hayes, and Williams v. Everett