Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/370

354 3 54 HAR VARD LA W RE VIE W. the completion of the building. Plaintiff's equity attached from the moment of the purchase, to any land in the neighborhood bought by defendant, and ran with the land when that passed into the hands of a subsequent purchaser with notice. — Lewis v. Golluer et al., 29 N. E. Rep. 81 (N. ¥«). Real Property — Executory Devise. — The testator by his will devised real estate to his son for life, and after his death to all the children of his son, whether then or thereafter to be born, who should attain twenty-one. He de- clared that his son should not have any power to sell or dispose of his life es- tate, and in case his said son should attempt to sell or dispose of the same, or become bankrupt, or the estate should be taken in execution by any process of law for benefit of any creditor, then he declared that the devise to his son should immediately become void, as if such son were then actually dead, and that the estate so devised to him should thenceforth vest in the persons who under the devises before mentioned would be next entitled. The son's interest was taken un execution, and consequently became void. Held, that in order to carry out Lestator's intention, the gift over must be construed, not as a contingent remain- der, but as an executory devise, so as to enable all the son's children in existence at the date of the order, or born, or to be born thereafter, to share in the prop- erty on their attaining twenty-one. Blackman v. Fysh, 39 VV. R. 520 (Eng. ). Devise, subject to a life estate, to the use of such child or children of the said E. D. " as either before or after the death of the said E. D." should attain the age of twenty-one. Held, an executory devise (following Lechmere v. Lloyd, 18 Ch. D. 524). Dean v. Dean, 39 W. R. 568 (Eng.). Tort — Seduction — Loss of Service. — The Statute of Limitations begins to run against an action for damages by a parent for the seduction of a child from the moment of seduction, and not from the time of loss of services. Dun- lap v. Linton, 22 Atl. Rep. 819 (Pa.). Torts — Trover — Pledge — Property in the Goods. — Goods were shipped under a bill of lading which provided that they, the goods, were to be delivered to the order of the consignor or his assignees. The invoices were sent to the consignee and a bill of exchange for the price drawn by the consignor on the consignee, which, together with the bill of lading endorsed in bla. k, was sold and delivered by the consignor to his bankers, with a hypothecation note author- izing the bankers to retain the bill of lading and sell the goods if the consignee either declined to accept the bill of exchange, or failed to pay it at maturity. The goods, on the arrival of the ship, were deposited by the ship-owner with the defendants, a railway company, to be delivered up on order of the ship- owners. The consignee of the goods, who had accepted the bill of exchange and paid the freight, induced the defendants wrongfully to hand over the goods to him without his producing either the bill of lading or any delivery order from the ship-owners. At a subsequent date, when the bill of exchange was about to become payable, the consignee requested the plaintiffs, who were his bankers, to pay it and debit his account therewith. The plaintiffs accordingly paid the bill of exchange and received it and the bill of lading from the consignor's bankers, and also obtained a delivery order from the ship-owner; but when they presented these to the defendant company, it was discovered that the latter had already given up the goods to the consignee. In an action for damages for the non-delivery of the goods by the defendant to the pLintiffs: Held, that the plaintiffs weie pledgees at law of the goods, and as such could maintain an action of trover or detinue against the d fendant company for non-delivery of the goods ; and the fact of the wrongful delivery of the goods having occurred before the accrual of the plaintiff's title afforded no ground of defence to the action. Bristol Bank v. Midland R.R. Co., 40 W. R. 148 (Ct. of App. Eng.). See note, p. 347. Wills — Testamentary Covenants — Validity. — A voluntary covenant in writing that the covenantor's executors shall, after her death, pay to the cov- enantee a certain sum is not contrary to the policy of the laws of Massachusetts. The reasons do not apply which underlie the statute requiring three witnesses to a will. Krell et al. v. Codman, 28 N. E. Rep. 578 (Mass.).