Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/367

351 RECENT CASES. 351 Constitutional Law — Obligation of Contracts. — There is no federal question involved in a decision of a State court upholding a statute which, l>y changing the terms of a contract between a city and a waterworks companx, im- paired the obligation thereof, within the prohibition of the federal Constitution, when it appears that the Contract claimed to have been impaired was ultra vires aM v 'id, and had been so declared by the State court. City of New Orleans v. New leans Water-works Co., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 142. Constitutional Law — Taking Property for Public Purpose. — A statute which provides that land may be flowed for the purpose of fish culture is constitutional, as the taking of private property is for a public purpose. And a pond maintained for the culture of useful fish, though maintained only for the pr .fit and benefit of the owner, is within the purposes of the act. Turner v. Nye, 28 N. E. Rep. 1048 (Mass.). Constitutional Law — Weavers' Fines Act Unconstitutional. — The Weavers' fines Act, passed by the Massachusetts Legislature of 1891, declaring that " No employer shall impose a fine upon, or withhold the wages, or any part of the wages, of an employ £ engaged at weaving, for imperfections that may arise during the process of weaving," is unconstitutional, as interfering with the inalienable right of " acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, guaranteed by the State Constitution, by restricting the necessarily incidental right to make reasonable contracts, and as impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the federal Constitution. Holmes, J., dissents. Com. v. Jerry, 28 N. E. Rep. 1126 (Mass.). See note on this case, 5 Harvard Law Review, 287. Contract — Insurance — Cancellation — When taking Effect. — By a New York statute it is obligatory upon fire insurance companies to cancel any policy issued by them at the request of the insured. Plaintiff, who held a policy from defendant, wishing to cancel it, mailed the policy, together with a letter expressing his purpose, to defendant's agent. After the time of mailing, but before the time of receipt by the agent, plaintiff's house was burned. Held, in a suit upon the policy, that he could recover; the notice of termination of the policy took effect when received, not when mailed. Crown Point Iron Co. v. ^Etna Ins. Co., 28 N. E. Rep. 653 (N. Y. Ct. of App.). The court distinguish these facts from the well-known case of the acceptance of an offer to contract {Vassar v. Camp, 11 N. Y. 441), by saying that there was here no element of contract. But qucere whether this explanation explains. Contracts — Mutual Consent — Offer of Reward. — A person who has captured a thief for whose apprehension a reward has been offered is entitled to the reward, although he made the capture in ignorance of the offer. Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Ad. 621, followed. Everman v. Hyman, 28 N. E. Rep. 1022 (Ind.). Contracts — Delay from Strike — Reasonable Time. — The obligation of a consignee ( f a cargo, under a bill of lading, which contains no specified limit of time for unloading, is to unload within a reasonable time after the arrival of the ship at the port of discharge, and the reasonableness of the time is to be measured by the circumstances existing at the time of the unloading. Held, accordingly, that a consignee of cargo under a bill of lading, who, through no act or default of his own, but owing entirely to a strike of laborers at the port of discharge, did not unload for nearly one month after the ship's arrival, was not liable to the ship-owner for damages for detention of the ship. Hick v. Rodocanachi, 40 W. R. 161 (Ct. of Appeal). By terms of a charter-party in which the port of discharge was specified, the cargo was " to be discharged with all despatch as customary." Held, that the effect of the charter-party was to render the charterers liable for delay occasioned by a strike of laborers at the port of discharge during the unloading of the cargo. Castigate Co. v. Dempsey (1892), 1 Q. B. 54. Criminal Law — Alibi — Reasonable Doubt. — Under the defence of an alibi it is sufficient if there is enough evidence to produce a reasonable doubt as to the presence of the prisoner at the killing. Adams v. State, 10 So. Rep. 106 A stricter rule is required in some jurisdictions, viz., that the prisoner must establish his alibi, if not beyond a reasonable doubt, at least by a preponder- ance of evidence, to entitle it to any weight. State v. Beasley, 50 N. W. Rep. 570 (la.).