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350 35Q HAR YARD LA W RE VIE W. of the crew was drowned. Held, that the underwriter is liable. The propeller was the liability cf the owner. And the restriction of the statute limiting the liability to vessels not "used in rivers or inland navigation" does not apply to a vessel used on the Great Lakes. Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97. Agency — Fellow- servant — Common Employment. — The captain and each of the crew of a vessel are fellow-servants engaged in a common employment, s > that the owner of a vessel is not responsible for an accident caused to the one through the negligence of the other. Hedlcy v. Steamship Co., 40 W. R. 113 (Ct. of Ap.). Bills and Notes — Acceptance by Telegram. — The plaintiff telegraphed to the defendant, asking him if he would accept a check drawn on him. The defendant answered in the affirmative. Held, this is an acceptance in writing within a Missouri statute providing that no acceptance shall be good unless in writing. Gairetson v. North Atchison Bank, 47 Fed. Rep. 867. Bills and Notes — Payment ok Forged Bill — Drawee injured by Negligence of Drawer. — A bank paid a forged check. The depositor was s > negligent in informing the bank of the forgery that, in the ordinary case, he would be chargeable with the amount. Held, the bank, in order to take advantage of this negligence, must show that it has been injured by it. Janin v. london & S. F. Bank, 27 Pac. Rep. 1100 (Cal.). Carriers — Liability in Tort for Ejection — Sunday Law. — Where plaintiff, having bought a ticket, is wrongfully put off defendant's trair, he can recover, although his contract for transportation was void under the Sunday statute. His action sounds in tort for "the violation of a personal right secured by the law," "in a certain sense independent" of the contract, although originating from it. Chicago, St. L„ & P. R.R. Co. v. Graham, 29 N. E. Rep. 170 (Ind.). Conflict of Laws — Bills of Exchange — Parol Acceptance. — An agreement made in Missouri by a resident of Illinois to accept and pay drafts at his place of business in Illinois is governed by the law of the latter State, to the exclusion of the Missouri statutes. And in Illinois such a parol promise is bind- ing on the acceptor. Hall v. Cordell, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154. Conflict' of Laws — Interest on Bond after Maturity. — Bonds of a South Carolina railroad company, made payable in pounds sterling, and both principal and interest to be paid at a designated banking-house in London, are sued on. It appears that the holder has for several years after maturity accepted interest at the English rate. The question is whether interest after maturity is to be paid at the rate paid in England or in South Carolina. Held, that the Eng- lish rate is to be paid. The form of the bond raises such a presumption, which is made conclusive by the receipt of that rate for several years. Coghlan v. So. Car. R. Co., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150. Constitutional Law — Eminent Domain — Grade Crossings. — Where a railroad corporation, formed under the general railroad law, locates its route so that its line crosses the route of another railroad, the law gives it the right to decide for itself whether it will cross such other road at grade or otherwise. The only limitation upon this right is that it shall not unduly impair either the safety or the reasonably fair enjoyment of the road whose route is crossed. Jersey City N. & W. Ry. Co. v. Central R.R. Co., 22 Atl. Rep. 728 (N. J.). Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce — State Taxes. — A Maine statute requires every railroad corporation in the State to pay *' an annual excise tax for the privilege of exercising its franchises," the amount of the tax to be determined according to a sliding scale proportioned to the average gross earn- ings per mile within the State for the year preceding the levy of the tax. Held, that the method of determining the amount of the tax is merely a way of ascer- taining the value of the privilege, and does not render the tax a tax upon the receipts themselves, and hence, in its application to railroads which enter the State from another State or Canada, the act does not operate as a regulation of interstate or foreign commerce — Bradley, Harlan, Lamar, and Brown, TJ., dis- senting. State of Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121. Diss. Opinion, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163.
 * ■ till a <4 ve96t4" and he an "owner" within the meaning of the statute limiting