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329 THE SUGAR BOUNTIES. 329 branch of industry upon which it is expended. All useful labor- ers, no matter what the field of labor, serve the State by increasing the aggregate of its products — its wealth. There is nothing of a public nature any more entitling the manufacturer to public gifts than the sailor, the mechanic, the lumberman, or the farmer. The State cannot rightfully discriminate among occupations, for a discrimination in favor of one branch of industry is a discrimination ad- verse to all other branches. The State is equally to protect all, giving no undue advantages or special or exclusive preferences to any. (p. 593.) Can a tax be constitutionally imposed by municipal corporations to load the tables of the few with bounty that the many may partake of the crumbs that fall therefrom? (p. 603.) In Allen v. Jay (60 Me. 124), the facts were that the town of Jay had in its town meeting voted to loan $10,000 to a firm of manufacturers, on condition that they would move their works to Jay and establish and maintain them there for ten years, the town to be repaid and the loan to be amply secured by a mortgage on the mill property. This vote was ratified by an Act of the legis- lature (1871, chap. 716). In declaring the Act void, the court (per Appleton, C. J.) state the proposition thus : Ultimately, it will be found that the question resolves itself into an inquiry whether the legislature can constitutionally authorize the ma- jority of a town to loan their own and the money ot a minority raised by taxation and against the will of such minority, as such majority may deter- mine. ... (p. 127.) While the State is bound to protect all, it ceases to give that just protection when it affords undue advantages, or gives special and exclusive preferences to particular individuals and particular and special industries at the cost and charge of the rest of the commu- nity. ... (p. 130.) The alleged justification for raising money to be loaned to private individuals for their own profit arises from the supposed public benefit to be made of the money so loaned. But the moment the loan is effected, the bonds and money raised from their sale become the bonds and money of the person borrowing, and subject to his control. . . (p. 131.) Whether the estates of citizens are to b; placed in the public treasury for the purpose of dividing them, or of loaning them to those who have not accumulated them, matters not. In either case, the owner is despoiled of his estate, and his savings are confiscated. If the loan be made to one or more for a particular object, it is favoritism. It is a discrimination in favor of the particular in- dividual, and a particular industry, thereby aided, and is one adverse to and against all individuals, all industries, not thus aided. If it is to be loaned at all, then it is practically a division of property under the name of a loan. It is communism incipient, if not perfected. . . . (p. 132.) The acquisition, possession, and protection of property are among the chief ends of government. To take directly or indirectly the prop- erty of individuals to loan to others for purposes of private gain and speculation against the consent of those whose money is thus loaned,