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328 328 HAR VARD LA W RE VIE W. and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected, nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. The principle of this distinction is fundamental. It underlies all government that is based upon reason rather than upon force. . . . An appropriation of money raised by taxation, or of property taken by right of eminent domain, by way of gift to an individual for his own private uses exclusively, would clearly be an excess of legislative power. The distinction between this and its appropriation for the con- struction of a highway, is marked and obvious. It is independent of all considerations of resulting advantage. The individual, by reason of his capacity, enterprise or situation, might be enabled to employ the money or property thus conferred upon him in such a manner as to furnish employment to great numbers of the community, to give a needed im- pulse to business of various kinds, and thus promote the general pros- perity and welfare. In this view it might be shown to be for the public good to take from the unenterprising and thiiftless their unemployed capital and entrust it to others who will use it to better advantage for ihe interests of the community. But it needs no argument to show that such an arbitrary exercise of power would be a violation of the constitutional rights of those from whom the money or property was taken, and an un- justifiable usurpation. 1 Substantially the same state of facts arose after the Charleston (S. C.) fire, and a similar statute was declared unconstitutional. (Feldman et alv. City Council, 23 S. C. 57.) In Maine, the same proposition has been laid down. The Supreme Court of that State were asked by the House of Repre- sentatives for their opinion on this question : Has the legislature authority under the constitution to pass laws enabling towns, by gifts of money or loans of bonds, to assist indi- viduals or corporations to establish or carry on manufacturing of vari- ous kinds within or without the limits of said towns? And if towns thus authorized may assist private parties, may they go further and establish manufactories entirely on their own account, and run them by the ordinary town officers or otherwise? In answering in the negative, the court (Opinion of Justices, 58 Me. 590) use the following language : Individuals and corporations embark in manufactures for the pur- pose of personal and corporate gain. Their purposes and objects are precisely the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic, or the day laborer. They engage in the selected branch of manufactures for the purpose and with the hope and expectation, not of loss, but of profit. The general benefit to the community resulting from every description of well-directed labor is of the same character, whatever may be the 1 Atty. Gen. v. Boston, 123 Mass. 460, 470; Agawam v. Hampden, 130 Mass. 528; Opinion of Justices, 150 Mass. 592, accord.