Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/306

290 290 HAR YARD LA W RE VIE W. Bills and Notes — Forged Bill — Fictitious Payee — Bills of Exchange Act. — The bills in question were entirely a forgery, except the acceptance, which was genuine, but procured by fraud. They were payable to the order of an existing person in whose favor the acceptor had often accepted similar genuine bills. But the bills in question were never delivered to the person named as payee, and the forger had not intended that they should be. The forger collected the amount of the bills from the bank of the acceptor upon a forged indorsement of the payee's name. The court held that the bank could charge its depositor with the amount so paid. The majority of the court reach this conclusion by the following steps: I. The acceptor is estopped to deny that there are bills of exchange. 2. The Bills of Exchange Act provides that "where the payee is a fictitious or nonexistent person," the bill may be treated as payable to bearer. A payee is fictitious, even though an existing person, if the drawer uses his name with no intention that payment shall be made to him. In order to treat a bill as payable to bearer as against the acceptor, it is not necessary under this statute that the acceptor should be aware of the non-existence of the payee. These bills were payable to bearer, and were therefore paid by the bank according to their tenor. Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers [1891] A. C. 107. Bills and Notes — Liability of Seller — Warranty. — The bona fide seller of negotiable bonds which are fraudulent reissues of genuine bonds is not liable to the purchaser on an implied warranty. Meyer v. Richards, 46 Fed. Rep. 727. Common Carriers — Taxable Property. — A Michigan statute exempts all necessary buildings used by a railroad corporation for its passenger and freight business. Held, that a grain elevator owned and operated by such corporation is within the provisions of the statute, and is not subject to general taxation. " It is complainant's grain depot, used in the business of transportation, and only used as a warehouse in connection with its regular business as a common carrier." Detroit Union R.R. Depot & Station Co. v. City of Detroit, 50 N. W. Rep. 302 (Mich.). Common Carriers — Telephone Companies. — The defendant, a telephone company, refused to furnish telephone instruments to the plaintiff, a telegraph company carrying on business in the same territory with defendant, unless the plaintiff agreed not to use the telephone in connection with the business of trans- mitting telegrams. The defendant was only a licensee, and the licensor, owner of all the patents on telephones, had agreed with a telegraph company, a rival of the plaintiff, to allow it the use of the telephones, but to deny this privilege to all other companies. Held, the telephone company is a common carrier, and must serve all persons alike. The contract with the rival telegraph company is void. State v. Del. tfc A. Tel. & Tel. Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 633. Constitutional Law — Police Power — Electric Wires. — Where the evidence shows that the stretching of electric wires over and upon the roofs of buildings is extremely dangerous, both as being liable to originate fires and as obstructions to the extinguishment of fires otherwise originated, a city ordinance absolutely prohibiting the practice is a valid exercise of the police power. Electric Co. v. San Francisco, 45 Fed. Rep. 593. Contract — Husband and Wife — Restraint of Marriage. — A con- tract by which a husband agrees to pay his divorced wife $45 a month for her support " for so long a time as she does not marry again " is not a restraint of marriage, nor in any wise against public policy. Jones v. Jones, 27 Pac. Rep. 85 (Col.). Contract — Insurance — Imputation of Knowledge. — Where a corpo- ration organized to transport, store, and insure petroleum, whose custom it is to contract with its customers to insure the oil in its tanks at its own expense, procures insurance thereon without any written request or representation as to ownership, the insurers cannot escape liability on the ground that the assured did not own the oil, since the insurers are chargeable with knowledge of the nature of the business of the assured, and will be held to have assumed the risk of any loss which it might sustain by reason of fire. Western db Atl, Pipe Lines v. Home Ins. Co, 22 Atl. Rep. 665 (Pa.).