Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/252

236 236 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. The assumption that the witness may go on and give details be- cause he may state as the ground of his opinion the fact that there were such sales is not justified by the usual rules of evidence, where the fact of an occurrence or existence of a thing being relevant is admitted in evidence, but the details of the occurrence or thing being irrelevant are excluded. As for instance the fact of a conversation 1 having taken place, or a letter having been received, may be admissible, 2 while what was said in the conver- sation or the contents of the letter may be inadmissible. It would seem reasonable that the party cross-examining a wit- ness should be allowed to elicit all the details of any sales men- tioned by the witness as a reason in the examination-in-chief, but even cross-examination should stop there, and should not go so far as to inquire of the witness whether he had considered other irrelevant sales in making up his mind, and then proceed to elicit the details of those sales, as is often done on the double plea that "it is cross-examination" and "the witness says he considered these sales in making up his mind." But such inquiry does not fall within the legitimate scope of cross-examination, as the law is very aptly stated by Mr. Justice Knowlton in giving the decision of the court in Sullivan v. O'Leary. 8 " The discretion exercised in regard to cross-examina- tion should not ordinarily go so far as to permit the introduction of evidence which has no legitimate relation to any of the issues on trial, and which is, at the same time, of such a character as to be likely to be applied to them by the jury, and improperly affect the verdict." In addition to the objection that irrelevant details, for whatever purpose introduced, would scarcely fail to be considered more or less for every purpose, there is the further objection that such de- tails, even though elicited on cross-examination, are objectionable, since they injuriously multiply the issues to be tried ; for each of these sales or appraisals is subject to explanation, 4 and all the circumstances surrounding them may be proved. And therefore on this ground alone, since they are immaterial to the direct issue, 1 McBride v. Cicotte, 4 Mich. 478 ; Pierce v. Gibson, 9 Vt. 216. 2 Mayo v. Mayo, 119 Mass. 290. 8 146 Mass. 322. See also Thompson v. Boston, 148 Mass. 387 j Crowell v. Porter, 106 Mass. 80.
 * Ham v. Salem, 100 Mass. 350.