Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/251

235 AN UNSETTLED POINT OF EVIDENCE. 235 by a witness-to-value as reasons for his opinion, and therefore if admissible at all they must be so on some peculiarity of their own. In the case of Sexton v. North Bridgewater 1 the court, citing Dickinson v. Fitchburg, held a witness-to-value was rightly per- mitted to state the reasons of his opinion, saying that " the nature of those reasons affected only the weight of this testimony." The reason alleged by the witness was that the change in the highway gave a right of way which the plaintiff did not have before. But this case cannot be quoted as an authority for the admissibility of such evidence as appraisals and the details of irrelevant sales, since it only determines that the witness may mention a fact, that the jury was entitled to consider independently of its being a reason of the witness's opinion. Possibly the language of the decision might be construed to allow a witness to mention as a reason for his opinion any fact how- ever irrelevant, as, for instance, that he had heard of or knew of sales and appraisals of other estates in the vicinity, which would seem to be legitimate ; but when he undertakes to go further and state the details of those sales or appraisals, then the evidence becomes objectionable. 2 In the case of Edmands v. Boston 8 a witness was allowed to give the details of sale, since it was in some sense a criterion and therefore admissible. The implication from this decision would seem to exclude irrelevant sales. There is no evidence in determining the value of land more satisfactory, but at the same time more misleading if not care- fully guarded, than the sales of other similar estates under similar circumstances and at about the same time, and accordingly, when the court has determined that there is the resemblance to make them a criterion, they are admitted in most jurisdictions as evi- dence of value; 4 but the use made of this expedient is to intro- duce to the jury sales that are misleading, and appraisals by assessors or others which the court would not allow the jury to consider as evidence of value, and which if allowed would be sufficient ground for granting a new trial. 6 1 116 Mass. 200. 2 Bollman v. Lucas, 22 Neb. 796. 8 108 Mass. 535. * Presby v. Old Colony Rd., 103 Mass. i, at p. 9. 5 Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 122 Mass. 305; Gardner v. Brookline, 127 Mass. 358, at p. 362.