Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/414

398 398 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, acter, and, therefore, not extraditable. To be incidental to the uprising, the offence must be committed with the intention of assisting it. In re Castioni [1891], I Q. B. 149 (Eng.). Negligence — Defective Bridges. — A city is only bound to maintain bridges of sufficient strength to afford facilities for the ordinary travel, and there- fore a person cannot recover for an injury caused by driving' upon the bridge a steam traction-engine, with a water-tank and threshing-machine attached, with- out showing that the bridge was designed to carry loads of equal weights, or that this was an ordinary use. One who contemplates going upon a bridge with an unusual weight must himself ascertain the probable sufficiency of the bridge. City of Wabash v. Carver^ 26 N. E. Rep. 42 (Ind.). Negligence — Electric Cars — Duty to Keep a Lookout. — The sound- ing of his gong by the motor-man of an electric street-car, which frightens a team hitched at the side of a street, causing it to run away, is not of itself negli- gence. The court says : " It was the duty of the driver to^ watch the track upon which the car was being propelled, and to avoid collisions and accidents upon the track. He was not required, we think, to keep a lookout for teams not upon or approaching the track." North Side St. Ry. Co. v. Tippins, 14 S. W. Rep. io67 (Tex.). Negligence — Proximate Cause — Contributory Negligence — Impu- TABIlity. — Defendant used in connection with his coke works a railroad whicb formed the arc of a circle, and was crossed twice by a common carriers' railroad, which subtended the arc as a chord. By the negligence of his servant, defend- ant's engine collided with a passenger train at one of the crossings. Just before the collision, the servant reversed the engine, shut off steam, and jumped. The concussion threw open the throttle, and the engine ran backwards around the arc and struck the train again at the other crossing, injuring the plaintiff. Held^ that the negligence of defendant's servant was the proximate cause of the injury, because no self-operating cause intervened. Held, further, that the contributory negligence of the carrier would not be imputed to the plaintiff, expressly over- ruling Lockhart v. lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. St. 151. Bunting v. Nogsett, 21 Atl. Kep. 31 (Pa.). Negligence — Proximate Cause. — A railroad employe was wrongfully injured in an accident, and afterwards, by mistake, poison was given him suffi- cient to cause the death of a well man, from the immediate effects of which he died. There was evidence tending to show that the injuries received were mortal, and that they caused him to succumb more quickly to the poison than if he had been well. The court below charged that, under the evidence, the death of the plaintiff's intestate must have resulted either from the injury he received, or from the poison he took; that the injury and the poison could not both have caused his death; that if he died from the effects of the poison, then they must find for the defendant, although his death was accelerated by reason of the injury received; or, if he died sooner from the effects of the poison than he would have died if he had not been injured. It was held that the charge was wrong; if the result was the necessary and inevitable effect of a first cause, and a new independent force intervened sufficient of itself «to produce the effect, and only hastened the result, both causes necessarily contributed to the result. Thomp- son v. Louisville dr^ N. R. Co., 8 So. Rep. 406 (Ala.). Quasi-Contract — Equal Equities. — A beneficiary named in a policy of insurance, but having no insurable interest In the life of the insured, paid the dues for the insured. Held, that he could not recover as money paid on a con- sideration which has failed, the policy being void only as to him, and the company having no notice that he, and not the insured, was paying the dues. Knights and Ladies of Honor v. Burke, 15 S. W. Rep. 45 (Tex.). Real Property — Descent — Murder of Ancestor by Heir. — A mur- dered his daughter for the express purpose of inheriting her land. He was convicted, and sentenced to death. Htld^ that the land did not descend to A, although he was the heir if the murder were not considered. Shellenberger v. Ransom, 47 N. W. Rep. 700 (Neb.). Riggs V. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, and Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, are dis- cussed by the court, and the reasoning in the former is accepted. See ante, p, 394-