Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/410

394 394 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. gain so that the merchant increased the price of the ton to 40s. payable at a certain day, and thus did he [Robert ] raise the price by 4s. ; and the said William hired a cart with four horses for a half-mark to carry the ton from Southampton to his house at Woodstock ; and when he came to Southampton he found that owing to what Robert had said the merchant was now of another mind, that he would not let him [have the wine] and told him right out that he heard tell so much evil of him that he would give him no credit; and so [William] returned from the port with the cart that he had hired as empty as when he took it thither, and none the less had to pay for its hire on the day fixed for payment; so that wrongfully and without reason did he [Robert] speak evil of and procure evil for him [William] to his damage of 40s. and shame of loos. If confess, etc. Tort and force and all that to tort belongeth, defendeth R[obert], who is here, against William of Woodstock, who is there, and his damages of 40s. and shame of iocs, and every penny of it, both against him and against his suit and all that he surmiseth against him ; and well he showeth thee that never did he supplant him of the said ton or raise the price against him by 4s or any penny as he surmiseth ; and of this he is ready to acquit himself in all such wise as this court shall award that acquit himself he ought. Fair friend Robert (saith the steward) this court awai:deth that thou be at a law six-handed at the next [court], etc. Can a Murderer acquire a Title by his Crime? — A de- cision which brings about a just result, but upon wrong grounds, is commonly mischievous as a precedent. A pertinent illustration of such mischief is to be found in Shellenberger v. Ransom (Nebraska, 189 1), 47 N. W. R. 700, in which case Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, was treated as a controlling authority. In the New York case a young man murdered his grandfather, in order to prevent a revocation of the latter's will, in which he, the grandson, was the principal bene- ficiary. Being convicted of the crime, and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of years, he still claimed the property as devisee. The ma- jority of the court, however, decided in favor of the testator's heirs, treating the will as revoked by the crime of the devisee. Two judges, dissenting, were of opinion that the will was not revoked, and that the grandson should keep the property in spite of his crime.' It seems possible to agree with the dissenting judges, that there was no revocation of the will, and also to agree with the majority of the court, that the grandson could not retain the property. By a familiar equitable principle, one who acquires a title by fraud or other uncon- scionable conduct is not allowed to keep it for himself, but is treated as a constructive trustee for the benefit of the victim of his fraud, or, if he be dead, for his representatives. Accordingly, full effect might have been given to the will, and yet the devisee, as a constructive trustee, might have been compelled to surrender his ill-gotten title to the testa- tor's heirs. In cases like Riggs v. F aimer, where the controversy is between the criminal and the representatives of his victim, the view here suggested and the view of the court may lead to a different mode of procedure ; but they accomplish the same practical result. But directly opposite results are caused in cases where the controversy is between a bona fide purchaser from the criminal, and the representatives