Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/38

22 22 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, too narrow and limited to include such large means of exercise. The right to wharf out embraces many privileges which cannot be included in, and have nothing to do with, a mere right of way. It is a right to the exclusive occupation of the submerged soil be- tween the upland and navigable water for docks, wharves, ware- houses, coal and lumber yards, mills, and, in fact, for all purposes of the commerce marine. Taking up the third view, we have already come to the conclu- sion that the right to wharf out is a right of property wholly independent of the right of access. The nature of the right only remains for consideration. Starting with the general proposition that the right to wharf out cannot be cut off without making compensation, it must be conceded that it is something more than a license. It is not a natural right. It must be, then, either an easement, or an estate in the submerged soil resting upon an implied grant of the State. It is not unreasonable to assume a grant of this nature. The fill- ing in of shallow water-fronts is conducive to the general, welfare in that it is a necessary aid to navigation, and the riparian owner has peculiar advantages and special facilities for making such im- provements. At any rate, the assumption of such a grant is a necessary premise to the holding that the right is a vested right of property. Does this implied grant of the State convey an easement or an estate in the soil under the water? That it conveys an estate in the submerged soil to the line of navigability, and not an ease- ment, is supported by the decisions which have construed express grants of a similar nature. In a Maryland decision it was said that the right of making improvements on the water front " is a vested right, a quasi prop- erty, of which they (the riparian proprietors) cannot be lawfully deprived without their consent; and if any other person make such improvement without their authority, such person is a tres- passer, and the improvement becomes the property of the owner of the adjacent land." ^ In a Virginia case the language of the court is : " This right of the riparian owner is not a mere license or privilege, but is prop- 1 Goodsell V. Lawson, 42 Md. 348, 366. The Maryland statute reads as follows: " The proprietor of land on any of the navigable waters of this State is hereby entitled to the exclusive right of making improvements into the waters in front of his said land.''