Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/301

285 NOTES, 285 that a single bottle of whiskey may not be shipped and sold by itself as a single and unbroken package, but it must be shipped alone and sold as shipped." This would seem to be a pretty strong decision, especially as it appeared in the case that the boxes in which the bottles of whiskey were transported were uncovered and furnished by the express company, while each bottle was sealed up in a separate paper package. One may infer from the opinion of the judge that a single bottle, properly sealed, would be considered an original package ; and on what principle he draws a distinction between one "single bottle" and half a dozen, which happen to be shipped at the same time and put for the sake of convenience into one box, and that an open, uncovered one, it is difficult to comprehend, and the opinion must be considered as greatly weakened in consequence. Logically, the learned judge would be obliged to hold that if a car-load of bottles of whiskey, each bottle sep- arately packed in a wrapper and sealed, were sent from one State to another, the original package would be the freight-car, and the original package would be broken as soon as the first whiskey bottle was re- moved. It is difficult to see the force of such reasoning as this. Logi- cally, each bottle would seem to be an original package, and if sold as shipped, it is difficult to discover on what principle the vendor could be indicted. May a Member of Congress Circulate his Speeches generally, IF Defamatory? In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Mr. Justice Story says : " Although a speech delivered in the House of Commons is privileged, and the member cannot be questioned respect- ing it elsewhere, yet if he publishes his speech, and it contains libellous matter, he is liable to an action and prosecution therefor, as in common cases of libel. And the same principles seem applicable to the privi- lege of debate and speech in Congress." § 866. To this the following note will appear in the 5th ed. of the same work (now in the press), by the editor, Mr. Bigelow : — The first sentence quoted would now be too broad a statement. A member of Parliament may certainly circulate among his constituents a speech made by him in Parliament. Wason v. Walter^ L. R. 4 Q. ^' 73> 95 j Davison v. Duncan^ 7 El. & B. 223, 229. (For the law of England before legislation see Stockdale v. Hansard^ 9 Ad. & E. I ; Wason v. Walter^ supra.) And it may be doubted whether any such qualification of the privilege as that suggested (of constitu- ency) can be worked in this country. Practically, the qualification is everywhere ignored, if it exists. Members of Congress, if not of the State Legislatures, act upon the supposition that the circula- tion, by themselves, of their speeches is {prima facie) privileged, and that the privilege is not limited in territory. And if such cir- culation is privileged, it cannot be limited in that way without absurd consequences. A member of the House of Representatives delivers a speech there, containing defamatory reflections upon some one ; on the next day he is transferred to the Senate, and the same speech, with the same reflections, is delivered there ; must the speaker be confined to the particular district which he represented in the House, in circulating the first speech, while he has the whole State for the