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284 284 HARVARD LAW RE VIE IV. perpetuities ; and they based their decision principally upon the opinion of the late Mr. Joshua Williams. "The idea that there cannot be a possibility on a possibility seems to have been a conceit invented by Chief Justice Popham,"^ and Mr. Williams himself admits that it is bad law, but nevertheless lays down absolutely the rule affirmed in Whitby V. Mitchell, saying that it is " apparently derived from the old doctrine which prohibited double possibilities." ^ That the rule in question was not derived from this, exploded doctrine, but was, on the contrary, a mere corollary to the rule against perpetuities, seemed to have been abun- dantly proved by the careful examination of authorities made by Mr. Lewis ^ and Mr. Gray* in their books on perpetuities; and the decision of Whitby v. Mitchell has since been impugned by an able article by Mr. Vaizey in the October number of the " Law Quarterly Review " ^ and also by the "Solicitors' Journal."^ In view of the exhaustive researches made by the writers above referred to, it would be useless for us to attempt any discussion of the subject ; and we content ourselves with the expression of a humble opinion that the Court of Appeal has made an erroneous decision. From a practical point of view, the decision is at least unfortunate ; for it puts a greater restriction upon future interests which happen to be in the form of contingent remainders than upon others, although on principle there seems to be no reason for making such a distinction. In regard to the question of remoteness, all future contingent interests are in reason upon the same plane, and it is to be regretted that a useless distinction should be made, based upon an evident misinterpretation of the old cases. One of the most perplexing questions which has arisen in connection with the *' original package" decisions is, what constitutes an original package? Whether, for example, where a box containing a dozen bottles of liquor is brought into a State, the box is the original package, or whether each bottle may be so treated. In the recent case of Allen V. Black^ in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Iowa, where a box containing bottles of whiskey was shipped from Illinois to Iowa, and sold by the bottle in Iowa, the court considered the question whether the bottle or the box was the original package as a doubtful one. In the Circuit Court in Mississippi, however, in the case of hi re Harmon,^ it was flatly decided that the box, and not the bottle, constituted the original package within the meaning of the deci- sions of the Supreme Court. The court says in this latter case : " These bottles were closely packed together in the boxes by the shipper, and in that form shipped to Sard is, and in that way they were kept by relator until sold and taken out, one bottle at a time. It was, in other words, a retail saloon. I am satisfied that the whiskey in the box, although in sepa- rate bottles for the convenience of the trade in this retail saloon, was but one package within the meaning of the interstate clause of the Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court.*' Further on the judge continues : " In reaching the above conclusion, I do not decide » Gray, Perp., § 125. ^ Williams, Real Prop. (6th ed.) 245. 3 Lewis, Perp., c. 16 & Suppl. 97-153. ■* Grav, Perp., §§ 125-133, 191-199, 287-298. S 24 L. Quar. Rev. 410. 6 35 Sol. Jour. 83 (Dec. 6th, 1890). 7 43 Fed. Rep. 228 (1890). « 43 Fed. Rep. 372 (1890.)