Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/298

282 282 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, and there seems to be no reason to doubt that they have the power to provide that transfers, instead of being made by recorded deed, shall be made by the giving up of one certificate and the issue of another, defining at the time, and once for all, the new taker's estate. In exceptional cases there would be some difificulty in ascertain- ing what the parties wished to do. Such cases would be rare : a vast majority of transfers are plain deeds or mortgages, perplex- ing, not from their contents, but from the necessity of finding them and of going through the whole train of them from a remote period. Even in cases of difficulty, it would be better to settle the questions at the time. But however this may be, it is hard to see how there can be any constitutional difficulty. A speculative objection has been raised with reference to the constitutional power of a State to recompense persons who, under a system of conclusive certificates, may lose title. To this there are two answers. I. It would be an entire novelty in this country to compensate persons who, after judicial notice deemed in law sufficient, are cut off. When we conclude to provide such com- pensation under our existing title-clearing statutes, it will be time to provide it under extension of them. 2. Experience has shown that, in practice, injury is almost never done, and that by the setting apart of a trifling portion of the fee charged for registra- tion, a fund can be created ample to satisfy all possible claims not disclosed by the records and not brought to light by the ju- dicial notice. It is needless, therefore, to consider the power of a State to provide indemnity. Such a discussion would only em- barrass the consideration of the practical question of registration of titles. H. W. Chaplin, Boston.