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246 246. HARVARD LAW REVIEW. whether these new appliances are an additional burden on the land, and whether this powerful current shall be allowed to inter- fere with our conversations over the telephone. It may be interesting to refer to some of the recent decisions on these three questions, and, as many of the cases are not yet re- ported, an account of them may prove useful to persons engaged in the controversy on either side. (i.) The question by what authority such use may be made of the public streets is not new, and is governed entirely by decisions relating to similar uses of the streets. It is only necessary, there- fore, to allude to the general rules on the subject, and to refer to the text-books where the matter is discussed. It is well settled that the use of the streets belongs to the public at large as distinguished from the municipality, that the Legislature represents the public, and that the municipality has no control over the streets except what is given to it by the Legis- lature, either expressly or by implication.^ The Legislature has (in the absence of constitutional restraint, and subject to the property rights and easements of the abutting owner) full and paramount authority over all public ways and public places. ** From this it follows that The authority of municipalities over streets and the uses to which they may be put depends entirely upon their charters or the legislative enactments applicable to them.^ The public easement in the highways is vested in the public, and can be divested by nothing short of an exercise of sovereign power. The Legislature, representing ithe public, may release the public right by vacating the highway, may modify the public use by granting a right to use the highway for a horse railroad, or may restrict the public use by granting a right to erect poles and other obstructions in the highway. What the Legislature can thus do, it may delegate authority to do. . . . No reason appears why all such authority possessed by the Legislature may not be thus delegated. But the delegation of such power must plainly appear either by express grant or by necessary implication.* 1 State, Hoboken Land Imp. Co., pros., v. Hoboken, 35 N. J. L. 208. 2 2 Dill. Mun. Corp., 4th ed., § 656 (518), and cases cited. 8 2 Dill. Mun. Corp., § 680 (538).
 * Per Magie, J., in Domestic Tel & Teleph. Co. v. Newark, 49 N. J. L. 344-346 (1887).