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230 230 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. police power for protection against evils from abroad, which is beyond the necessity for its exercise wherever it interferes with the rights and powers of the Federal government. " ^ 3. The third case is Walling ^'. Michigan, ^ which is also cited in Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Railway Co., as a case by which '* the present case is concluded. " This case turned upon the vaUdity of a statute of the State of Michigan, which imposed a tax upon all persons engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors, im- posing a heavier burden upon the agents of non-resident dealers than it did upon those of resident dealers. The court held, that inasmuch as the tax operated to the disadvantage of the products of other States, it was in effect a regulation of commerce between the States, and the statute was therefore void. Replying to the suggestion that the tax was " an exercise of the police power of the State for the discouragement of the use of intoxicating liquors and the preservation of the health and morals of the people, " the court say, " This would be a perfect justification of the act if it did not discriminate against the citizens and products of other States in a matter of commerce between the States, and thus usurp one of the prerogatives of the national Legislature. " ^ The case is decided solely upon the ground of discrimination, and the judgment was in no way conclusive upon the court in a case like Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Railway Co., where there was no discrimination. The court, in the latter case, note the difference in the two cases, and say, * " It would be error to lay any stress on the fact that the statute passed upon in that case [ Walling v. Michigan ] made a discrimination between the citizens and products of other States in favor of those of the State of Michigan. . . . This appears plainly from what was decided in the case of Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, " which is the fourth case relied upon in Leisy 2;. Hardin. 4. In Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District ^ the question of police power was not involved at all. The statute there declared to be void was one requiring all drummers, not having a licensed place of business within the Shelby Taxing District, and offering for sale or selling goods by sample, to be licensed and pay a fee therefor. The question discussed was whether the license tax was upon the occupation or upon commerce ; and the court held that in effect it was a tax upon commerce, and a regulation of commerce, and 1 95 U. S. 465, 473. *ii6U. S. 446. 8 Ibid. 460.
 * 125 U. S. 465, 496. 6 120 U. S. 489.