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212 212 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. the letter, have come under any obligation save what the law- declares ; and, however expressed, that obligation is simply to observe the legal right of the sender, whatever it may be, and whether it be called his right of property in the contents of the letter, or his right to privacy.^ A similar groping for the principle upon which a wrongful pub- lication can be enjoined is found in the law of trade secrets. There, injunctions have generally been granted on the theory of a breach of contract, or of an abuse of confidence.^ It would, of course, rarely happen that any one would be in the possession of a secret unless confidence had been reposed in him. But can it be supposed that the court would hesitate to grant relief against one who had obtained his knowledge by an ordinary trespass, — for instance, by wrongfully looking into a book in which the secret was recorded, or by eavesdropping } Indeed, in Yovatt v. Win- yard, I J. & W. 394 (1820), where an injunction was granted against making any use of or communicating certain recipes for veterinary medicine, it appeared that the defendant, while in the plaintiff's employ, had surreptitiously got access to his book of recipes, and copied them. Lord Eldon '* granted the injunction, upon the ground of there having been a breach of trust and con- fidence;" but it would seem to be difficult to draw any sound legal distinction between such a case and one where a mere stran- ger wrongfully obtained access to the book.^ ^ "The receiver of a letter is not a bailee, nor dots he stand in a character analogous to that of a bailee. There is no right to possession, present or future, in the writer. The only right to be enforced against the holder is a right to prevent publication, not to re- quire the manuscript from the holder in order to a publication of himself." Per Hon. Joel Parker, quoted in Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 2 Bush. 480, 489 (18^7). 2 In Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, 255 (1851), a suit for an injunction to restrain the use of a secret medical compound, Sir George James Turner, V. C, said : "That the court has exercised jurisdiction in cases of this nature does not, I think, admit of any question. Different grounds have indeed been assigned for the exercise of that jurisdic- tion. In some cases it has been referred to property, in others to contract, and in others, again, it has been treated as founded upon trust or confidence, — meaning, as I conceive, that the court fastens the obligation on the conscience of the party, and enforces it against him in the same manner as it enforces against a party to whom a benefit is given, the obligation of performing a promise on the faith of which the benefit has been con- ferred; but upon whatever grounds the jurisdiction is founded, the authorities leave no doubt as to the exercise of it." 8 A similar growth of the law showing the development of contractual rights into rights of property is found in the law of goodwill. There are indications, as early as the Year Books, of traders endeavoring to secure to themselves by contract the advantages now designated by the term " goodwill," but it was not until 1743 that goodwill received