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210 210 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. bring it within the line of those cases which were relied upon as precedents. ^ This process of implying a term in a contract, or of im- plying a trust (particularly where the contract is written, and where there is no established usage or custom ), is nothing more nor less than a judicial declaration that public morality, private justice, and general convenience demand the recognition of such a rule, and that the publication under similar circumstances would be considered an intolerable abuse. So long as these circum- stances happen to present a contract upon which such a term can be engrafted by the judicial mind, or to supply relations upon which a trust or confidence can be erected, there may be no objection to working out the desired^ protection through the doctrines of contract or of trust. But the court can hardly stop there. The narrower doctrine may have satisfied the demands of society at a time when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have arisen without violating a contract or a special tection being due for the products of a man's own sk 11 or mental labor ; whereas in the present case the person photographed has done nothing to merit such protection, which is meant to prevent legal wrongs, and not mere sentimental grievances. But a person whose photograph is taken by a photographer is not thus deserted by the law ; for the Act of 25 and 26 Vict., c. 68, s. i, provides that when the negative of any photograph is made or executed for or on behalf of another person for a good or valuable considera- tion, the person making or executing the same shall not retain the copyright thereof, unless it is expressly reserved to him by agreement in writing signed by the person for or on whose behalf the same is so made or executed ; but the copyright shall belong to the person for or on whose behalf the same shall have been made or executed. " The result is that in the present case the copyright in the photograph is in one of the plaintiffs. It is true, no doubt, that sect. 4 of the same act provides that no proprietor of copyright shall be entitled to the benefit of the act until registration, and no action shall be sustained in respect of anything done before registration ; and it was, I presume, because the photograph of the female plaintiff has not been registered that this act was not referred toby counsel in the course of the argument. But, although the protec- tion against the world in general conferred by the act cannot be enforced until after registration, this does not deprive the plaintiffs of their common-law right of action against the defendant for his breach of contract and breach of faith. This is quite clear from the cases of Morison v. Moat [9 Hare, 241 ] and Tuck v. Priester [19 Q. B. D. 629] already referred to, in which latter case the same act of Parliament was in question. " Per North, J., ibid. p. 352. This language suggests that the property right in photographs or portraits may be one created by statute, which would not exist in the absence of registration ; but it is sub- mitted that it must eventually be held here, as it has been in the similar cases, that the statute provision becomes applicable only when there is a publication, and that before the act of registering there is property in the thing upon which the statute is to operate. ^ Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden, 329; Murray v. Heath, i B. & Ad. 804; Tuck V. Priester, 19 Q. B. D. 629.