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209 THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY. 209 photographer's using his negative. " But the court, while ex- pressly finding a breach of contract and of trust sufficient to justify its interposition, still seems to have felt the necessity of resting the decision also upon a right of property, ^ in order to c ., customer to take his or her portrait is justified in striking off copies of such photograph for his own use, and selling and disposing of them, or publicly exhibiting them by way of advertisement or otherwise, without the authority of such customer, either express or implied. I say * express or implied, ' because a photographer is frequently allowed, on his own request, to take a photograph of a person under circumstances in which a sub- sequent sale by him must have been in the contemplation of both parties, though not actually mentioned. To the question thus put, my answer is in the negative, that the photographer is not justified in so doing. Where a person obtains information in the course of a confidential employment, the law does not permit him to make any im- proper use of the information so obtained ; and an injunction is granted, if necessary, to restrain such use ; as, for instance, to restrain a clerk from disclosing his master's accounts, or an attorney from making known his client's affairs, learned in the course of such employment. Again, the law is clear that a breach of contract, whether ex- press or implied, can be restrained by injunction. In my opinion the case of the pho- tographer comes within the principles upon which both these classes of cases depend. The object for which he is employed and paid is to supply his customer with the required number of printed photographs of a given subject. For this purpose the nega- tive is taken by the photographer on glass ; and from this negative copies can be printed in much larger numbers than are generally required by the customer. The customer who sits for the negative thus puts the power of reproducing the object in the hands of the photographer ; and in my opinion the photographer who uses the negative to produce other copiesfor his own use, without authority, is abusing the power confidentially placed in his hands merely for the purpose of supplying the customer; and further, I hold that the bargain between the customer and the photographer includes, by implication, an agreement that the prints taken from the negative are to be appropriated to the use of the customer only. " Referring to the opinions delivered in Tuck z'. Priester, 19 Q. B. D. 639, th e learned j ustice continued : '* Then Lord Justice Lindley says : ' I will deal first with the injunction, which stands, or may stand, on a totally different footing from either the penalties or the damages. It appears to me that the relation between the plaintiffs and the defendant v>as such that, whether the plaintiffs had any copyright or not, the de- fendant has done that which renders him liable to an injunction. He was employed by the plaintiffs to make a certain number of copies of the picture, and that employment carried with it the necessary implication that the defendant was not to make more copies for himself, or to sell the additional copies in this country in competition with his employer. Such conduct on his part is a gross breach of contract and a gross breach of faith, and, in my judgment, clearly entitles the plaintiffs to an injunction, whether they have a copyright in the picture or not. ' That case is the more noticeable, as the con- tract was in writing ; and yet it was held to be an implied condition that the defendant should not make any copies for himself. The phrase 'agross breach of faith 'used by Lord Justice Lindley in that case applies with equal force to the present, when a lady's feelings are shocked by finding that the photographer she has employed to take her likeness for her own use is publicly exhibiting and selling copies thereof. " North, J., in Tollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345, 349-352 ( i£88 ). "It may be said also that the cases to which I have referred are all cases in which there was some right of property infringed, based upon the recognition by the law of pro-
 * "The question, therefore, is whether a photographer who has been employed by a