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207 r THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, 207 deliberate expression of thoughts and emotions in literary or ar- tistic compositions and the casual and often involuntary expression given to them in the ordinary conduct of life. In other words, it may be contended that the protection afforded is granted to the conscious products of labor, perhaps as an encouragement to effort.^ This contention, however plausible, has, in fact, little to recommend it. If the amount of labor involved be adopted as the test, we might well find that the effort to conduct one's self properly in business and in domestic relations had been far greater than that involved in painting a picture or writing a book ; one would find that it was far easier to express lofty sentiments in a diary than in the conduct of a noble life. If the test of delib- erateness of the act be adopted, much casual correspondence which is now accorded full protection would be excluded from the beneficent operation of existing rules. After the decisions denying the distinction attempted to be made between those literary productions which it was intended to publish and those which it was not, all considerations of the amount of labor in- volved, the degree of deliberation, the value of the product, and the intention of publishing must be abandoned, and no basis is dis- cerned upon which the right to restrain publication and reproduc- tion of such so-called literary and artistic works can be rested, except the right to privacy, as a part of the more general right to the immunity of the person, — the right to one's personality. It should be stated that, in some instances where protection has been afforded against wrongful publication, the jurisdiction has been asserted, not on the ground of property, or at least not wholly on that ground, but upon the ground of an alleged breach of an implied contract or of a trust or con- fidence. Thus, in Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1825), where the plaintiff, a distinguished surgeon, sought to restrain the publication in the " Lancet " of unpublished lectures which he had delivered at St. Batholomew's Hospital in London, Lord Eldon as to manuscripts independently of Parliamentary additions and subtractions, its opera- tion cannot of necessity be confined to literary subjects. That would be to limit the rule by the example. Wherever the produce of labor is liable to invasion in an anal- ogous manner, there must, I suppose, be a title to analogous protection or redress," Knight Bruce, V, C, in Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 696.
 * " Such then being, as I believe, the nature and the f)undation of the common law