Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/218

202 202 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Prince Albert i>. Strange, the court held that the common-law rule prohibited not merely the reproduction of the etchings which the plaintiff and Queen Victoria had made for their own pleasure, but also ** the publishing (at least by printing or writing), though not by copy or resemblance, a description of them, whether more or less limited or summary, whether in the form of a catalogue or otherwise."^ Likewise, an unpublished collection of news pos- sessing no element of a literary, nature is protected from piracy.^ That this protection cannot rest upon the right to literary or artistic property in any exact sense, appears the more clearly ' **A copy or impression of the etchings would only be a means of communicating knowledge and information of the original, and does not a list and description of the same? The means are different, but the object and effect are similar; for in both, the object and effect is to make known to the public more or less of the unpublished work and composition of the author, which he is entitled to keep wholly for his private use and pleasure, and to withhold altogether, or so far as he may please, from the knowledge of others. Cases upon abridgments, translations, extracts, and criticisms of published works have no reference whatever to the present question; they all depend upon the extent of right under the acts respecting copyright, and have no analogy to the exclusive rights in the author of unpublished compositions which depend entirely upon the com- mon-law right of property." Lord Cottenham in Prince Albert v. Strange, i McN. & G. 23, 43 (1849). " Mr. Justice Yates, in Millar v. Taylor, said, that an author's case was exactly similar to that of an inventor of a new mechanical machine; that both original inventions stood upon the same footing in point of property, whether the case were mechanical or literary, whether an epic poem or an orrery; that the immorality of pirating anotherman's invention was as great as that of purloining his ideas. Property in mechanical works or works of art, executed by a man for his own amusement, instruction, or use, is allowed to subsist, certainly, and may, before publication by him, be invaded, not merely by copying, but by description or by catalogue, as it appears to me. A catalogue of such works may in itself be valuable. It may also as effectually show the bent and turn of the mind, the feelings and taste of the artist, especially if not professional, as a list of his papers. The portfolio or the studio may declare as much as the writing-table. A man may employ himself in priate in a manner very harmless, but which, disclosed to society, may destroy the comfort of his life, or even his success in it. Every one, however, has a right, I apprc hend, to say that the produce of his private hours is not more liable to publication with* out his consent, because the publication must be creditable or advantageous to him, than it would be in opposite circumstances.'* tiff's rights, but also that the invasion is of such a kind and affects such property as to entitle the plaintiff to the preventive remedy of an injunction ; and if not the more, yet, certainly, not the less, because it is an intrusion, — an unbecoming and unseemly intru- sion, — an intrusion not alone in breach of conventional rules, but offensive to that inbred sense of propriety natural to every man, — if intrusion, indeed, fitly describes a sordid spying into the privacy of domestic life, — into the home (a word hitherto sacred among us), the home of a family whose life and conduct form an acknowledged title, though not their only unquestionable title, to the most marked respect in this country." Knight Bruce, V. C, in Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 696, 697.
 * ' I think, therefore, not only that the defendant here is unlawfully invading the plain-
 * Kiernan v, Manhattan Quotation Co., 50 How. Pr.'i94 (1876).