Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/217

201 THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY. 201 of that term. A man records in a letter to his son, or in his diary, that he did not dine with his wife on a certain day. No one into whose hands those papers fall could publish them to the world, even if possession of the documents had been obtained rightfully ; and the prohibition would not be confined to the publication of a copy of the letter itself, or of the diary entry ; the restraint extends also to a pubhcation of the contents. What is the thing which is protected t Surely, not the intellectual act of recording the fact that the husband did not dine with his wife, but that fact itself. It is not the intellectual product, but the domestic occurrence. A man writes a dozen letters to different people. No person would be permitted to publish a list of the letters written. If the letters or the contents of the diary were protected as literary compositions, the scope of the pro- tection afforded should be the same secured to a published writing under the copyright law. But the copyright law would not prevent an enumeration of the letters, or the publication of some of the facts contained therein. The copyright of a series of paintings or etchings would prevent a reproduction of the paintings as pictures ; but it would not prevent a publication of a list or even a description of them.^ Yet in the famous case of 1 *' A work lawfully published, in the popular sense of the term, stands in this respect, I conceive, differently from a work which has never been in that situation. The former may be liable to be translated, abridged, analyzed, exhibited in morsels, complimented, and otherwise treated, in a manner that the latter is not. of a catalogue, — suppose a man to have composed a variety of literary works (* inno- cent,' to use Lord Eldon's expression), which he has never printed or published, or lost the right to prohibit from being published, — suppose a knowledge of them unduly ob- tained by some unscrupulous person, who prints with a view to circulation a descriptive catalogue, or even a mere list of the manuscripts, without authority or consent, does the law allow this? 1 hope and believe not. The same principles that prevent more candid piracy must, I conceive, govern such a case also. subjects, he may be exposed, not merely to sarcasm, he may be ruined. There may be in his possession returned letters that he had written to former correspondents, with whom to have had relations, however harmlessly, may not in after life be a recommen- dation; or his writings may be otherwise of a kind squaring in no sort with his outward habits and worldly pi sition. There are callings even now in which to be convicted of literature, is dangerous, though the danger is sometimes escaped. "Again, the manuscripts may be those of a man on account of whose name alone a mere list would be matter of general curiosity. How many persons could be men- tioned, a catalogue of whose unpublished writings would, during their lives or after- wards, command a ready sale !" Knight Bruce, V. C, in Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De Gex & Sm. 652, 693.
 * Suppose, however, — instead of a translation, an abridgment, or a review, — the case
 * ' By publishing of a man that he has written to particular persons, or on particular