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200 2 oo HAR VARD LA W RE VIE W. publishes it.^ It is entirely independent of the copyright laws, and their extension into the domain of art. The aim of those statutes is to secure to the author, composer, or artist the entire profits arising from publication ; but the common-law protection enables him to control absolutely the act of publication, and in the exercise of his own discretion, to decide whether there shall be any publication at all.^ The statutory right is of no value, unless there is a publication ; the common-law right is lost as soon as there is a publication. What is the nature, the basis, of this right to prevent the pub- lication of manuscripts or works of art } It is stated to be the enforcement of a right of property ; ^ and no difficulty arises in accepting this view, so long as we have only to deal with the re- production of literary and artistic compositions. They certainly possess many of the attributes of ordinary property : they are transferable ; they have a value ; and publication or reproduction is a use by which that value is realized. But where the value of the production is found not in the right to take the profits arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the common acceptation 1 Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden, 329 (1758); Bartlett v^ Crittenden, 5 McLean, 32, 41 (1849). '^ Drone on Copyright, pp. 102,104; Parton w. Prang, 3 Clifford, 537, 548 (1872); Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 815, 867, 962 (1854). ^ "The question will be whether the bill has stated facts of which the court can take notice, as a case of civil property, which it is bound to protect. The injunction cannot be maintained on any principle of this sort, that if a letter has been written in the way of friendship, either the continuance or the discontinuance of the friendship affords a rea- son for the interference of the court." Lord Eldon in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 413(1818). cases not aided or prejudiced by statute, shelters the privacy and seclusion of thought and sentiments committed to writing, and desired by the author to remain not generally known." Knight Bruce, V. C, in Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 695. " It being conceded that reasons of expediency and public policy can never be made the sole basis of civil jurisdiction, the question, whether upon any ground the plaintiff can be entitled to the relief which he claims, remains to be answered; and it appears to us that there is only one ground upon which his title to claim, and our jurisdiction to gtant, the relief, can be placed. We must be satisfied, that the publication of private letters, without the consent of the writer, is an invasion of an exclusive right of prop- erty which remains in the writer, even when the letters have been sent to, and are still in the possession of his correspondent." Duer, J., in Woolsey, v, Judd,4 Duer, 379, 384 (1855).
 * Upon the principle, therefore, of protecting property, it is that the common law, in