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199 THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, 199 method of expression adopted. It is immaterial whether it be by- word ^ or by signs,^ in painting,^ by sculpture, or in music* Neither does the existence of the right depend upon the nature or value of the thought or emotion, nor upon the excellence of the means of expression.^ The same protection is accorded to a casual letter or an entry in a diary and to the most valuable poem or essay, to a botch or daub and to a masterpiece. In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to the public.^ No other has the right to publish his productions in any form, without his consent. This right is wholly independent of the material on which, or the means by which, the thought, sentiment, or emotion is expressed. It may exist independently of any corporeal being, as in words spoken, a song sung, a drama acted. Or if expressed on any- material, as a poem in writing, the author may have parted with the paper, without forfeiting any proprietary right in the com- position itself. The right is lost only when the author himself communicates his production to the public, — in other words, 1 Nicols V. Pitman, 26 Ch. D. 374 (1884). 2 Lee V. Simpson, 3 C. B. 871, 881 ; Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatchf. 256. 6 "Assuming the law to be so, what is its foundation in this respect? It is not, I conceive, referable to any consideration peculiarly literary. Those with whom our com- mon law originated had not probably among their many merits that of being patrons of letters; but they knew the duty and necessity of protecting property, and with that gen- eral object laid down rules providently expansive, — rules capable of adapting them- selves to the various forms and modes of property which peace and cultivation might discover and introduce. "The produce of mental labor, thoughts and sentiments, recorded and preserved by writing, became, as knowledge went onward and spread, and the culture of man's under- standing advanced, a kind of property impossible to disregard, and the interference of modern legislation upon the subject, by the stat. 8 Anne, professing by its title to be preamble, whether it operated in augmentation or diminution of the private rights of authors, having left them to some extent untouched^ it was found that the co-nmon law, in providing [ot the protection of property, provided for their security, at least before general publication by the writer's consent." Knight Bruce, V. C, in Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 695 (1849). vantage, loss or gain. The author of manuscripts, whether he is famous or obscure, low or high, has a right to say of them, if innocent, that whether interesting or dull, light or heavy, saleable or unsaleable, they shall not, without his consent, be pub- lished." Knight Bruce, V. C, in Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652, 694.
 * Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. 121; s. c. ib. 510.
 * Drone on Copyright, 102.
 * For the encouragement of learning,* and using the words 'taken the liberty,* in the
 * "The question, however, does not turn upon the form or amount of mischief or ad-