Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/202

186 1 86 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, down broadly that what would otherwise be a nuisance could be jus- tified by showing that it was done in a "convenient place," was over- ruled in Bamford v. Turnley (3 B. & S. 62) ; but the language of the court in the latter case is worthy of attention as indicating the exact scope of the decision. Bramwell, B., for example, who concurred in overruling Hole v. Barlow^ said that " those acts necessary for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and houses may be done, if conveniently done, without subjecting those who do them to an action," though the same acts would be nuisances if done wantonly or maliciously. And the leading case of St. Helen's Smeltmg Co. v. Tipping (11 H. L. C. 642) shows that the principle on which Hole V. Barloiv was decided cannot be wholly ignored, that the court cannot escape considering the nature and reasonableness of the act complained of. According to the charge of Mellor, J., of which the House of Lords expressed particular approval, " everything must be looked at from a reasonable point of view," and the jury must take into account "all the circumstances, including those of time and locality." In view of such expressions as these, and of Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce's well-known observation in Walter v. Selfe (4 De G. & Sm. 315, 322), that the test is not to be found in " elegant and dainty modes and habits of living," but in the "plain and sober and simple notions among English people," one is not very seriously impressed with the damage suffered by the plaintiff on such facts as appear in Reinhardt v. Men- tasti.^ Moreover, as is pointed out in 6 Law Quarterly Review, T14, it is not altogether easy to reconcile the decision with Robinson v. Kilvert (41 Ch. Div. 88), where a similar radiation of heat from the defendant's boilers, not great in itself, but causing serious damage to deHcate pro- cesses ot manufacture carried on by the plaintiff, was held by the Court of Appeal not to be a nuisance. THE LAW SCHOOL LECTURE NOTES. [These notes were taken by students from lectures delivered as part of the regular course of in- struction in the School. They represent, therefore, no carefully formulated statements of doctrine, but only such informal expressions of opinion as are usually put forward in the class-room. For the form of these notes the lecturers are not responsible.] Mens Rea in Criminal Cases. — {From Mr. Chaplin's Lectures.) — One often finds the rule laid down that the me?ts rea., or criminal intent, must always be proved in order to maintain a criminal prosecution. This, however, is far from true, or at most can only be stated as a general prin- ciple subject, like most general principles, to limitations. L It is not always and invariably essential at common law that one should have a criminal, or even a wrongful, intent. In cases, for example, of religious belief, it has been held unnecessary to prove the mens rea (as where a father, believing it sinful to seek medical aid in time of sickness, rather than to have faith in prayer, was charged with the death of his infant son).^ In the case of Rex v. Ogdefi^ where the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully transposing from one gold ring ^ Compare the remarks of Dodderidjre, J., Jones v. Powell, Palmer, 536 : ♦' Si home est cy tender nosed oue ne V'cAi indurer Seacole it doit lesser son mease." 2 Reg. V. Downes, 13 Cox, C C. in. « 6 C. & P. 631.