Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/199

183 NOTES. 183 Within the last few weeks three very interesting cases have come up in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the matter of liquor sold in private clubs in a prohibition town. These cases decide that such clubs are within the prohibition of the statute, and are common nuisances. The first case is that of Commonwealth v. Jacobs^ the steward of the Warren Social Club, of Worcester. Defendant had been accus- tomed to order large quantities of liquor from wholesale dealers. This liquor was brought to a place kept by the club, and stored there, under the supervision of the steward, in the names of individual members, who called for it from time to time as they wanted it. The court held that this was as much within the provisions of the statute "as if the hquors were bought and dispensed as the property of the club." In the second case, that of Commonwealth v. Ryan^ steward of the Pelican Club, of Worcester, it appeared that the members had attempted to evade the statute by having a number of lockers, one for each mem- ber ; in each locker was stored a quantity of liquor, each botde being labelled with the name of the owner. The defendant was duly con- victed, and the court, in affirming the conviction, said that " there was evidence from which a jury might have inferred" that the arrangement in question was "a mere device to cover up the unlicensed sale of in- toxicating liquors. The court could not say, as a matter of law, that there was no evidence to warrant a conviction." The third case was that of Commonwealth v. Baker, steward of the Commercial Social Union, of Worcester. Defendant set up the defence that the club did not fall within the provisions of the statute, which declares that " all buildings or places used by clubs for the purpose of selling, distributing, and dispensing intoxicating liquors to their mem- bers or others, shall be deemed common nuisances." ^ The club in question owned no liquor itself, and only dispensed it to those of its members to whom it belonged. Defendant contended that the statute did not prohibit the use of rooms for such a purpose, but the court denied the force of the contention in the following passages from the opinion : — by a club to sell intoxicating liquor to its members, or to distribute among its members intoxicating liquors owned by them in common, or to procure for and dispense to its members intoxicating liquor which was bought for and belonged to them individually. " If the club, by its agent, purchased and stored intoxicating liquors for its members, and dealt out in portions to each member, upon his order, the liquor belonging to and kept for him, and kept the place for that purpose, the place is a common nuisance under the statute. " The club in the case at bar used its rooms for a purpose for which a license was required. It not only had no license, but it was in a city where such license is prohibited. As the evidence not disputed by the defendant showed that the club used its rooms for the purpose of dis- pensing intoxicating liquor to its members, it is unnecessary to consider whether, upon the whole evidence, the jury could properly have found that the club used the place for the sale of intoxicating liquor." In view of these decisions, it will be practically impossible for clubs formed and incorporated for " purposes of social intercourse " to keep 1 Mass. Rev. Sts. 1887, c. 206.
 * ' A place must be equally a nuisance under the statute whether used