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140 140 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Courts ; states many absurd arguments which were put forward ; and fails to discover any that will bear for one instant the light of modern criticism. This doctrine of indissoluble marriage, however, was so forcibly im- pressed upon men's minds that it is only within the last thirty years that the world has really awakened to the fact that all the mediaeval arguments for the indissolubility of marriage are sheer nonsense and superstition, and that there are no other arguments. Herein, then, lies the cause of the increase of divorce. In Mr. Fisher's own words, — "The arguments which upheld indissoluble marriage are gone, and the arguments which upheld semi-indissoluble marriage (if I may be allowed the word) are also largely gone. If we intend to stop divorce we must invent new arguments. Abstract or mystic theories will be of no avail. The subject is down on the bed-rock of utility. We must show by actual proof that divorce is an evil in its practical results. The statistician must take the place of the priest. Probably all that we shall be able to show will be that certain causes of divorce are evil in their results." The possibility of inventing satisfactory arguments Mr. Fisher does not discuss, but in a later article, published in the " Philadelphia Sun- day Press" of July 13th, 1890, he lays stress upon the importance of preserving " the family," and insists upon the necessity of scientific in- vestigation of the whole subject. Whatever opinion one may hold as to the existence of arguments, one cannot but join Mr. Fisher in his demand for thorough investigation, and render acknowledgment to him for his own careful research. The case of Cochrane v. Moore (25 Q. B. D. 57) is one of much interest. The well-known decision of Irons v. Smallpiece (3 B. & Aid. 551), that delivery was necessary to the parol gift of a chattel, though apparently settled law in this country, has not, as is shown by the collection of authorities in Professor Gray's note to Irons v. Smallpiece^ been treated with great respect in England ; and later decisions had so far shaken it that Lopes L. J. felt bound to hold mCochrane v. Moore at nisi prius that delivery was not necessary to a gift. But the Court of Appeal has upheld Irons v. Smallpiece in an elaborate judgment. The point was not, indeed, necessary to the decision ; various consid- erations arose on the facts, among others the inquiry whether the subject-matter of the gift, the undivided fourth part of a horse, was susceptible of delivery at all ; and as to the actual decision the court agreed with Lopes L.J. and dismissed the appeal. They discussed, how- ever, at great length the question decided in Irons v. Smallpiece. The following passage from the opinion of Fry L. J. speaking for himself and Bowen L. J. indicates the grounds of the decision : " This review of the authorities [the opinion contains an extended investigation of the early reports and text-writers] leads us to the conclusion that according to the old law no gift or grant of a chattel was effectual to pass it, whether by parol or by deed and whether with or without consideration, unless accompanied by delivery ; that on that law two exceptions have been grafted, one in the case of deeds and the other in that of contracts 1 Gray's Cas. Property, 167.