Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/112

96 96 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Real Property— Eminent Domain — Compensation. — A school district purchased a " squatter " title to certain land and built a school-house thereon. The real title was in one S., against whom proceedings were now instituted to get the land by the right of eminent domain. Held, that although the legal title to the school-house had vested in S., the "just compensation "to be allowed him would not include compensation for the building. Searl v. School District Mo. 2, lo Sup. Ct. Rep. 374. Real Properiy — Injury to Reversion — Measure of Damages. — In a suit for damages for injury to the land, only nominal damages can be recovered in the first action for the injury to the reversion; if the obstruction be continued thereafter, vindictive damages can be recovered in a second suit to compel the removal of the same. Mason v. Norfolk Ry. Co., 26 Can. L. J. 185. Real Property — Mortgage — Sale under Power. — A mortgagee had purchased at his own sale, under a power which did not authorize him to become the purchaser. Held, that the infant heirs of the mortgagor, who was dead at the time of the sale, could disaffirm it any time within two years after attaining their majority, provided twenty years had not elapsed. Alexander v. Hill, 7 So. Rep. 238 ( Ala. ). Real Property — Perpetuities. — A. devised real estate to trustees in fee for B. for life ; remainder for life to B.'s children, successively ; remainder in fee as the longest liver of B. and his children should by will appoint. Held, ( over- ruhng Av,rn v. J .loyd, L. R. 5 Eq. 383), that although the survivor would have an absolute interest, still as he was not necessarily ascertainable within lives in being and twenty-one years, the power was void. In re Hargreaves, 43 Ch. Div. 401 ( Eng. ). For a full discussion oiAvern v. Iloyd s&q Gray, Perp., chap. vii. Real Property — Pre-emption. — A. settled on land to secure it under the United States pre-emption laws. She died a year later. Her administrator had the patent made out to the heirs, and later got an order from the Probate Court to sell it to pay A's debts. Held, that the land never was the property of A. and could not be sold for her debts. Coulson v. Wing, 22 Pac. Rep. 570 ( Kan. ). Real Property — Righis of Innocent Disseisors. — A mortgagee in pos- session under a void foreclosure erected a dwelling-house on the land supposing himself to be the absolute owner. Finding out his mistake, he removed the house, doing no damage to the land, held, that on these facts the mortgagee had the right of removal. Cook v. Cooper, 22 Pac. Rep. 945 ( Oreg. ). Real Property — Rights of traitor in Confiscated Pkoperty. — Property was confiscated and sold for the treason of the owner, under the United States statutes authorizing such confiscation for the term of the owner's life. The owner was subsequently pardoned, and then conveyed all his right, title, and interest in the property. Defendant claims under this conveyance. Action by the heirs of the original owner. Held, that the removal of his disabilities by pardon invested in plaintiff's ancestor the power of disposition over the reversion of the property, expectant upon the termination of the confiscated estate, that power having been in suspension during his disability. Semble, the reversion in fee remained in the original owner after the confiscation proceedings, though he had no power of disposing of it vvhile he was under disabilities. Illinois C, R, Co., et al. v. Bosworth et al., 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231, Sale — Custom of Trade. — Held, a custom of trade among the corn mer- chants of Augusta would bind only those who had recognized it in their own transactions. Semble, it is not enough to show that both the contracting parties were aware of the custom. Killer v. Moore, 10 S. E. Rep. 360 ( Ga. ). Tort — Contributory Negligence. — It is not contributory negligence in a person to risk his life or place himself in a position of great danger in an attempt to save another from death or great bodily harm, provided such acts do not con- stitute rashness. Peyton v. Texas <2r» P, Ry, C<?., 6 So. Rep. 690 ( La. ). Fol- lowing Eckert V. Railroad Co.^ 43 N, Y, 503.