Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/964

928 928 HARVARD LAW REVIEW federal borrowing power, they receive a corresponding advantage for their own borrowing power. The same considerations apply to taxation of income from official salaries. In this field the Supreme Court may, if it wishes, overrule Collector v. Day,''^ and permit the inclusion of state salaries in the federal income tax, and overrule Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County J^ and permit the states to tax the salaries of federal ofl&cials. A salary exempt from a tax which other salaries must bear is in- creased by that much. Now that we have a federal income tax, a $5,000 professorship in a state university yields more than a $5,000 professorship in an endowed institution of learning. In the absence of a state income tax, a $6,000 federal judgeship is worth no more than a $6,000 law practice. A state income tax makes the ermine more attractive than it was before. The law as it now stands makes the states and the United States undergo sacrifices, each for the benefit of the other. Neither government would suff'er appreciably if the burnt offering were no longer required. But if it is required of either, it should be required of both. So long as Mr. Dobbins is exempt, Mr. Day should be also. The considerations which justify exempting either of them are political rather than economic. While from the political standpoint there is more reason to apprehend state encroachment on federal power than federal encroachment on state power, this can hardly justify a court in holding that a state tax on a federal salary interferes with a federal instrumentality, if a federal tax on a state salary is thought to be immune from criti- cism. The conclusion to be drawn from our review and analysis of the decisions is that, in spite of cross currents and shifting winds of doctrine, the states will be permitted to continue the indirect en- croachments on federal authority thathave hitherto been sanctioned. They will be allowed to impose taxes that fall on interstate com- merce and on the federal borrowing power, if they do it in approved ways. The decisions under the commerce clause may nearly all be referred to the judicial conviction that the federal system demands that the states shall not discriminate against interstate commerce, or indulge in forays on property or business beyond their borders, but does not demand that interstate commerce be relieved from proportionate contributions. The decisions which have permitted ''* Note 72, supra. ™ Note 21, supra.