Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/924

888 888 HARVARD LAW REVIEW But there would seem to be no objection to a statute which for- bids nonresidents to do business within the state without having consented to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as to all causes of action arising within the state and out of the business carried on within the state. Such a provision seems essentially- just. Very clearly provisions allowing creditors to attach the as- sets employed in the business within the state are desirable and proper, and such provisions are well-nigh universal; but very fre- quently the business is carried on without the use of any property within the state. In such a case should a creditor of the business be bound to resort to other states to search out and discover the owner of the business? That would seem to be a hardship to the creditor. The words of Mr. Justice Swayne, speaking of the un- fairness of refusing a creditor the right to sue a foreign corporation in the state where the corporation was carrying on business and where the cause of action arose, are equally applicable here. "In many instances the cost of the remedy would have largely exceeded the value of its fruits. In suits local in their character, both at law and in equity, there could be no rehef. The result would be, to a large extent, immunity from all legal responsibility." ^' On the other hand there is little hardship on the owner of the business if he is required to answer for all claims arising out of the business in the place where the business is carried on. A statute requiring persons carrying on business within the state to consent to service of process upon an agent in actions arising within the state out of the business carried on within the state, would therefore seem to fall within the proper scope of the police power. If a state has power to forbid a nonresident to do business with- out having filed a consent to service of process upon his agent, the question arises whether the state has jurisdiction in the absence of such express consent. We have seen that in the case of corpora- tions, on one or the other of three possible theories, the Supreme Court has held that the state may acquire jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business within the state, as to causes of action therein arising, although no consent was expressly given. How far are these three theories applicable to the case of nonresident indi- viduals? It seems impossible to say that the nonresident is present and "found" within the state; an individual cannot be present «7 Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 WaU. (U. S.) 65, 84 (1870).