Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/920

884 884 HARVARD LAW REVIEW tion in doing business within the state, not from its voluntary- consent to be bound by the laws of the state. ^® Here is no illegiti- mate assumption of power by the state; Tobago is not trying to bind the rights of the whole world. Having examined the possible bases of jurisdiction over foreign corporations, we may turn again to the question of Jurisdiction over nonresident persons.^" When citizens of other states seek to do business within the state, either as individuals or as partners, the state has no power arbitrarily to exclude them. To do so would violate the provision of Article IV, section 2, of the federal Constitution that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States"; and the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." But because the state cannot exclude, it does not follow that it may not impose conditions upon admission. It is well settled that a state may, in the reasonable exercise of the police power, regulate business carried on within the state, although the business is of an interstate character and although it is carried on by nonresidents. Under the pretence of exercising the poHce power, to be sure, the state may not impose burdens upon interstate commerce, or take property without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro- tection of the laws, or deny to citizens of the several states and citizens of the United States the privileges and immunities guaran- which has ceased to do business within the state if the cause of action arose in the state before the withdrawal. Mutual Reserve Life, etc. Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147 (1903); McCord Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 97 Fed. 22 (C. C. A., 8th Circ, 1899); Tucker v. Insurance Co., 232 Mass. 224, 122 N. E. 285 (1919). Cf. Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573 (1910). It would be impossible to say that at the time of service the corporation is present within the state. People's Tobacco Co. V. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79 (1918). These decisions can be upheld only on the theory of implied consent, or on the theory suggested by Judge Hand. «" I have not attempted to distinguish cases where the business is carried on by a partnership from those in which it is carried on by an individual. In ovu- law a part- nership is not treated as an entity. If it were so treated it would be possible to apply many of the principles apphcable to corporations which are not appUcable to indi- viduals. See Worcester, etc. Co. v. Firbank, PauMng & Co., [1894] i Q. B. 784; Von Hellfeld v. Rechnitzer and Mayer FrSres & Co., [1914I i Ch. 748; Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U. S. 524 (1889); State V. Adams Express Co., 66 Minn. 271, 68 N. W. 1085 (1896).
 * ' A state may validly provide for service of process upon a foreign corporation